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The concept of inter-American solidarity is based
on the principles of social, cultural, and, ultimately,
political unity of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere*
This unity depends upon the observance of non-intervention,
the right of self-determination of states in their na-
tional affairs, and the exercise of representative
democracy* Through hemisphere economic cooperation, it is
hoped to obtain the good life for all the people*
Implicit in the concept of solidarity is the need
for security* In the present world environment of change,
the transitional societies of the hemisphere are prey to
revolutionary communism which challenges traditional con-
cepts and the social-political status quo of the Americas*
A case study of Fidel Castro *s Cuba serves to
illustrate and illuminate the apparent state of the
mystique of American solidarity and points up the challenge
to infuse it with new dynamism—only by so doing, can
solidarity avoid utter fragmentation*
'
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THE BASIS OP THE CONCEPT OF
INTER-AMERICAN SOLIDARITY
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of the solidarity of the nations of the
Western Hemisphere is based on three broad principles*
The first signifies a social and cultural, and ultimately
a political unity among its peoples. The second is an
important adjunct to the attainment of that unity: the
principle of non-intervention in the sovereign affairs of
neighboring states. This leads directly into the third
principle which affirms that self-determination in na-
tional affairs will be the exercise of representative
democracy; and, finally, that the good life for people
living in such a society is best secured through economic
cooperation among the American states.
Implicit in the concept of solidarity is the need
to secure its explicit aspirations against the exercise of
uncontrolled power by any state within the hemisphere and
to repel any threat by forces alien to its principles from
without the hemisphere.
In the first instance, what success the inter-
American system has had in maintaining its solidarity is

2due to the manner in which a single member, possessing a
preponderance of military, economic, and political power,
has exercised restraint in the use of that power in its
relations with twenty smaller and weaker neighbors*
Simple restraint has not always been enough, how-
ever* Given the vast disparity of power between the
United States and her hemisphere neighbors, not only
action, but inaction as well, have important effects on
the fortunes of the other members of the system* In
spite of the fact that the desire of Latin Americans for
an end to intervention in the narrow sense of the word has
been largely satisfied, the subtler, but deeper, forms of
influence in the matter, for example, of supplying or
withholding military or economic aid by the United States,
has been felt throughout the area* Bolivia is not eco-
nomically viable without United States aid, and dispensing
it generously or in a mere trickle would vitally affect
Bollvan national life* The supply of military arms to
Fulgencio Batista and the sudden withdrawal of this aid
had decided psychological and morale, if not military,
effect on the regime and its defeat by revolutionary
forces* To spurn this kind of influence from one source
Samuel F. Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the
United States (New York! TTarcourt-Brace, 1943), 275^
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4that traditional concepts and usual practices in hemis-
phere relations have not escaped the challenge of revolu-
tionary change which is being hurled at every aspect of
the existing order of things*
Let us here attempt to grasp something of the
diffuse nebulae of American solidarity as it had come to
exist after World War II,
II. THE CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY
By 1945 a consensus existed within the Americas
about the concept of inter-American solidarity* Its
principles were incorporated formally in the preamble and
declarations of the Act of Chapultepec adopted by the
Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace
convened in Mexico City in that year* In 1947 the high
contracting parties to the Rio Treaty reaffirmed their
adherence to these principles "all of which should be
understood to be accepted as standards of their mutual
relations and as the juridical basis of the Int r-American
system*
"
At Bogota, Colombia, in 1948, the Charter of Bogota
established the international organization whose purpose
3Department of State, Publication 3016, Inter-
national conference Series II » Inter-American Conference
for the"
"
Malntenance of Peace and Security ashington:
Government tr inting "o7flce, 1948), preamble* Cited here-
inafter as the Rio Treaty.
'
5it was to promote the solidarity of the American states,
to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their
sovereignty, their territorial integrity, and their inde-
4pendence. The preamble to the Charter states the con-
viction that the Americas have an historic mission to
offer man a land of liberty and an environment favorable
to the development of his individual personality and the
5
realisation of his Just aspirations*
This is a part of the political her i age of the
West which in Latin America has sought to minimize the
race and class distinctions which originated in the
European conquest. It is part of Latin America's tradi-
tion which "includes a highly developed sense of indivi-
dual freedom, equality, independence and human dignity, as
well as devotion to the search for the good life*" They
are ideas which historical interpretation once credited to
the Age of Enlightenment as inciting causes of the Latin
7American independence movement*
signed at the Ninth international Conference of American
states, Bogot :, March 30-May 2, 1948* Cited hereinafter
as the QAS Charter *
5Ibld *
Harold B« Davis, Government and Politics in Latin
America (New York: Ronald Press Company, 1S58), p. 21*
Arthur P. Whitaker (ed*), Latin America and the
*
6Modern political theory generally rejects the sim-
plistic version of ideas as the sole causal factor in
major political changes, but ideas are the cohesive
materials which bind the variables of international
politics into meaningful human endeavor. With the emer-
gence of an entire hemisphere freed from Old World
hegemony, the fact of independence nurtured the presuppo-
sition of a larger and more embracing idea* Arthur
8Whitaker has called it the Western Hemisphere Idea , the
core of which is the proposition that "the peoples of this
Hemisphere stand in a special relationship to one another
9
which sets them apart from the rest of the world." The
premises of this special relationship are the conceptions
of nature and of human nature underlying all political
thought, which are shared by Americans. It is the idea of
the rights of individuals and the moral responsibility of
the citizen as a person which serves as the basis of con-
stitutional democracy in the West. £ach of these has
Enlightenment , "The Enlightenment and Latin American
Independence , »' by Charles C. Griffin (New York* Cornell
University Press, 1961), p. 121.
o
Arthur r. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea
(New York; Cornell University Press, 1954;.
9Ibid ., p. 1.
10William Y. Slliott and Neil A. MacDonald, Western
Political Heritage (Snglewood Cliffs, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall , 1949 ) , p. 18.

7found its place, explicitly set forth in the Charter of
Bogota and in numerous resolutions of the governments
meeting in the inter-American system*.
The geographical proximity of the republics in the
hemisphere, coupled with a cluster of social, cultural and
political ideas, flavored with a dash of the mystical as
well as the rational, had manifested itself in a unique
connotation of political solidarity* Thus, as early as
1813, Thomas Jefferson was referring to that unity of the
American peoples which extended to all their "modes of
11
existence." As recently as 1952 an eminent Mexican
writer and diplomat, Luis Quintanilla, expressed the con-
cept oi solidarity in these terms:
Not only do geographical closeness and similar
historical backgrounds bring us together, but we
share in common an idea about the organization of
society and of the world • • • • To face the fact
of America is to glance at any map. From pole to
pole, from ocean to ocean, we are all in the same
boat, we were created to live together .12
Here, expressed and implied, are several of he ideas upon
which Americans base the ethos of their association:
geographical unity, common ideas and institutions, and a
common experience in adapting to a new environment, and
independence from Jurope.




12 d., p. 4, citing Luis Quintanilla.
.
IThe solidarity of the hemisphere was, in fact, born
of and nourished by the determination to insulate America
from Europe and its perpetual broils* But a shrinking
world and the complexities of international life have
always facilitated the inter-play between America and
Europe which has periodically strengthened and paradoxi-
cally weakened the concept and its application on a
regional basis. There are also strong tendencies toward
13fragmentation.
However strong the bases of solidarity, its develop-
ment has been paralleled by a strong dissent which denies
it universal acceptance* For with the fear of Russian and
French intervention in the hemisphere, there was born the
14American doctrine of non-intervention. It owes its
birth to the hemispheric extension by the United States of
her national policy of isolation inherited from Washington's
15Farewell Address and the Monroe Declaration of 1823.
13Northwestern University, United Statas-Latin
American Relations , The Organization of American States ,
a study prepared by Professors George"""B*lanksten, Harold
Guetskow and John Plank for the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1959), p. 14 « Cited hereinafter as OAS Study.
14Samuel F« r>emis, The Latin American Policy of the








9But not all Americans were converted to the hemisphere
system in 1823.
Simon Bolivar's plan for international cooperation
was not attuned to the idea of hemisphere solidarity but
rather envisioned a Spanish-American union, linked for
protection, not with a fledgling United States, but the
17powerful British nation* Far imperative to the sov-
ereign independence of the former colonies was a source of
power to defend their new status* A mutuality of defense
interest quickened the nascent notion of & xrity among
Americas, North and South* It was the enunciation of the
Monroe Doctrine, marking the assumption by the United
States of the traditional role of Great Britain as guaran-
tor, however, that also marked the United States as a
principal malefactor as well as chief benefactor of the
hemisphere* Although the United States lacked the posi-
tive power at the time to make her guarantee good, fate
was kind in extra-hemisphere relations and no challenge
seriously threatened a renunciation of th responsibilities
she had assumed* In the hemisphere, her preponderance of





" Joseph B* Lockey, Fan Americanism : Its Begin-
nings ( ew York j The Kacmillan Co., 1920), p* 100.




valuable asset of the inter-American system and to some,
its nemesis, because freedom from extra-continental intc
vention gave way to fear on the part of Latin American
states of intervention by the "Colossus of the North."
This was inspired by the Manifest Destiny and continental
13
security calculus of the United States. Manifold inter-
ventions by the United States over the years have seen the
resolution of the question of non-intervention into a
negative absolute in inter-American affairs which lessens
solidarity*
Similarly, from a germ of the concept of non-
intervention contained in the Treaty of Perpetual Union,
League and Confederation, signed at the Panama Congress in
1826, through the law treatise of Or. Carlos Calvo and
20the doctrine of Or. Luis M. Drago, the prohibition of
forceful intervention to coerce a state has become an
inclusive dogma which subjects almost any external actions
2iby a state to the epithet "intervention," and threatens
solidarity from within.
' Albert K. Weinberg, Manifest Destiny : A / of
Nationalist xpansion in American History (Baltimo?
The Macraillan Co., 1937T, pp. 102-12 7.
19
A. J. and Ann W. Thomas, The Organization of Amerl-
. M States (Dallas: Southern Methodist University
T5£"3), p. 157.
2 Ibid . t p. 158.
21A* J. and Ann W. Thomas, "Democracy and the OA
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However, the acceptance by the United States of the
principle of non-intervention at Montevideo in 1933 and
Buenos Aires in 1936 represented a signal victory for
twenty smaller and weaker neighbors over a dominantly
powerful Northern nation* The acquiescence to such a con-
cession by a major world power exacted by the diplomacy of
twenty individually and collectively weak nations is the
spirit of the idea at the foundation of American solidarity*
But as the concept of solidarity is paralleled by a dis-
senting consensus, so is the principle of non-intervention.
At the Congress of Panama, Bolivia proposed that
member states should intervene to support constitutional
governments against revolution* Pedro Felix Vicuna of
Chile and Juan Bautista Alberdi of Argentina, each made
22proposals as early as 1837 and 1844, respectively, which
anticipated the most notable expressions of interven-
tion! sm in our day: the Doctrine of Rodriquez Larrata set
forth in 1945, which proposed multilateral intervention in
23defense of human rights and democracy* irticle 5 of the
Minnesota Law Review . Vol. XLVI, 1961-1962 (Minneapolis:
University" linnc-sota, 1962).
Whitaker , The Western Hemic p, Idea , op . cit .
,
p. 54*
23Pan American Union, Consultation of the Government
of Uruguay ap
m
^lies of t nments
Tsm Between"" racy ar ce , the" International"
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Charter of Bogota affirms that the solidarity of the
American states requires the exercise of representative
democracy, but also that
each state shall have the right to develop its
cultural, political and economic life freely and
naturally 2.*nd7 shall respect the rights of the
individual and the principles of universal
morality. 24
Often a discouraging outlook is conveyed by Latin
American domestic politics. But the Church, a majority of
the intelligentsia, and the developing middle class and
urban working class share a disposition to broaden the
base of political activity • to establish orderly processes
for changing government, and reinforcing fundamental in-
25dividual freedoms* Unfortunately, human rights, like
democracy, had been relegated to an inferior position in
the inter-American programs of the Organization of American
States by the era of absolute non-intervention. It was to
26
receive a new stimulus following the Cuban revolution.
A strengthening of collective interest in restoring and
of Man and Collective Action in Defense oi those irinciples
Washington, O.C., 1946).
24
' Ibid * » £L *ter . Art. 13.
25
orles 0. Porter and Robert J. Alexander,
Struggle for Jemocracy in Latin America (New York:
till ~~*~' "". ' \ I ".
26
' John C. Dreier, The Organization of American
States (Council on foreign ReTal or. irE
and Row, 1963), p. 103.
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perpetuating human rights in accordance with the Charter
of the Organization of American States through the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights remains, however,
27
stymied by the old bugaboo of non-intervention. Inter-
vention of any kind to correct infractions of basic human
rights has been held to be potentially more dangerous
than their denial*
Another principle of solidarity is that economic
cooperation is essential to the common welfare and pros-
perity of the peoples of the continent and that social
29
security and social justice are bases of lasting peace*
This is an important principle having roots in the free
and reciprocal trading policies formulated by the United
30States after gaining its independence* Rapid indus-
trialization in North America has left Latin America
behind among the underdeveloped agrarian-based economies
of the world* Here a disparity of power between the
United States and twenty smaller and weaker nations, this
time in economic matters , illustrates again the dominant
importance of the Yankee nation in the American system*
27Ibid.
, pp. 104-5.
26Ibld *. p* 95.
29GAS Charter , 0£. cit
.
, Art. 5.
30J. Fred Rippy, 31obe and Hemisphere (Chicago:
Henry Regnery Co., 1958), p. 10.
•
14
Next to its acceptance of the principle of non-
intervention, the task of exacting from the United States
economic aid for their social betterment has been a major
goal of the Latin republics* This line of endeavor has
been both consistent and persistent and
,
in the main,
envisaged by the Latins as a Marshall Plan for Latin
America, consisting of massive and practically unregulated
grants on a government-to-government basis after the
fashion of the highly successful European economic re-
covery program.
The United States, however, had persisted in a
laissez faire attitude toward economic, as well as social
31
and cultural areas of aid. The possibility exists that
the Cold War, with the concurrent threat to the hemisphere
status quo will bring a change in this attitude; for, as
far as the Latin Americans are concerned, the inter-
American system is moving away from the philosophy of
classical liberalism toward a philosophy that stresses the
necessity and desirability of planning and state enter-
32prise in economic and social areas*
The United States, as prime representative of a
satisfied status c^uo , has found itself challenged by the
31





forces of change in a way which it did not expect and in a
context of "Cold War" with which it cannot, as a repre-
sentative democracy, cope speedily and decisively,
struggle heretofore enacted painfully in t I istern Hemis-
phere has chosen the Western half of the world as its
stage. This American nation now finds its role reversed*
Its revolutionary challenge to the colonial status quo of
the eighteenth century made the united States once the
champion of a transitional order. The vast frontiers of
the New World, the fluidity of colonial rivalry manipulated
by European monarchies made the American revolution-
hallowed as it was by the symbol of personal freedom from
tyranny—a cut above the squalid struggles in Europe for
freedom and reform. Less than two hundred years later the
United States has become a status quo power confronted by
an economic and social revolution to which has been added
the element of political "reform" advocated by communism*
As the principal defender of American solidarity
against "Old World" corrur tion and intransigence, the
United States is confounded by the fact that the very
principles from which hemispheric cohesion derives—
respect for national sovereignty and non-intervention-
are themselves among the factors inducing fragmentation.
The very action in which the hemisphere has demonstrated
its solidarity most strongly, namely, cooperation against

16
outside powers to maintain national independence, itself
33
emphasizes the individual autonomies of the nations.
There are other factors contributing to fragmenta-
tion; their expression in intense nationalism permeates
the hemisphere. All the states of the hemisphere vary
with respect to size, resource endowment, ethnic composi-
tion of their populations, social structure, politi
forms, and degree of economic development; with minor
exceptions the Latin American states are not natural
trading partners but competitors in the world market for
the sale of a limited number of primary commodities.
Finally, extra-hemispheric pulls tend to divide. The
United States with worldwide commitments tends often to
ignore Latin America for Europe; historically strong Latin
34ties with Spain and Portugal have become weaker, and an
increasingly disparate economic social relationship with a
preoccupied United States has given rise to new specula-
tions about Pan-Latin Americanism. Arthur Whitaker is of
the opinion that there is a general trend "towards a
strengthening of the solidarity of the Latin American







35Arthur P. Whitaker, Nationalism in ^atin Ameri





Countering these strong forces toward fragmenta-
tion, however, are factors inducive to inter-Araeri^
solidarity* These, in the main, are those discussed
earlier and are political and ideological* They derive
from a common opposition to outside powers and from a
widely held mythos that citizens of the New World share a
common destiny in the pursuit of freedom. Some scht
have concluded that these forces for solidarity are weaker
36than those tending toward disunity*
In the presence of such views and with the purpose
of judging the truth of such a conclusion in light of the
Cuban situation and actions of the inter-American system
of Punta del Este to deal with it, this thesis was under-
taken* To the present time, few better cases pertinent to
the concept of solidarity and its efficacy can be found
than in the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs which was convened to answer a threat to
American solidarity*
36Northwestern University, op * clt , , pp. 14-15*

CHAPTER II
THE COMMUNIST THREAT TO SOLIDARITY
I • INTRODUCTION
The solidarity of the Americas has never been so
pronounced as when the security of the hemisphere has been
threatened by extra-continental powers. The present
international tension between East and West, described as
the Cold War, presents a situation which all American
states cannot easily and readily identify as wholly
inimical to their individual and collective interests.
There are many and varied factors which enter into the
evaluation of the Cold War situation by the Latin Ameri-
cans* Of particular importance and impact, however, seem
to be the feelings of nationalism, of sovereign independ-
ence from any external influences which might make it
appear that they are less than equals in the international
political system. Their increasing desire to be autonomous
agents and to assert authority over their own sovereign
lands and peoples has led to a less than unanimous and
strong backing for the principles of solidarity.
This rent in the curtain of collective effort and
achievement is in part due to the differing views taken by
the United States and her twenty smaller neighbors toward

19
the threat of international Communism to the Americas.
This chapter and the one which follows is a presentation
showing some of the diversity of views, actions, and re-
actions to Communism in the hemisphere.
II. THE UNITED STATES VIEWS THE THREAT
In the view of the United States, the Cold War be-
tween the Western democracies and the Communist totali-
tarian states brought with it a serious threat to the
solidarity of the Americas. This threat was recognized
early by the United States, and its policy became in-
creasingly geared to counter the expansionist nature of
first Soviet, then Red Chinese, communist policies. Since
shortly after World War II, it has been acutely aware that
communist ideology and practice are militantly opposed to
non-communist societies and that their subversion is a
fundamental aim of the Communists.
The United States recognized that the most fertile
field for Communist expansion was among underdeveloped and
emerging national states. In Latin America, the political,
social, and economic factors affecting the revolution of
rising post-war expectations presented an environment of
instability in which Communism could flourish. Nationalism,
economic development, change in class relationships and
the ideal of political democracy are basic components of
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the revolution. These are interacting with the conditions
of poverty, oppression, class and racial barriers and
generally backward conditions which have precipitated a
discontented indigenous population. The product is a con-
tinuing demand on the part of the masses for greater
freedom, political participation, and social and economic
equality.
While the United States has been relatively oblivi-
ous to these basic components of the Latin American social
revolution, the Communists have been sensitive to each,
exploiting their popular demands and representing the
United States as the keeper of a status quo which bars
their realization. The Communists have enlisted support
for a variety of anti-imperialism campaigns which have
invariably depicted the United States as the bane of Latin
2American revolutionary hopes and aspirations. Playing
upon latent suspicion and jealousy of their powerful
Northern neighbor, the Communist influence has had re-
markable success in capturing the imaginations of the
peoples in transition in Latin America. The acquisition
by Communists of a dominant role in Guatemala in the early
Robert J. Alexander, Communism in Latin America
(first edition; New Brunswick, New Jersey:"" Rutgers




1950*8, the shocking treatment accorded Vice President
Nixon in Lima and Caracas and, finally, the crowning irony
of the Cuban defection to Communism, awakened the United
States to the reality that the communist threat to American
solidarity was present in the very hemisphere which Thomas
Jefferson had once remarked was reserved to a distinct
3
system of interest separated from the rest of the world.
The United States was to begin to see that interest in
terms of the economic and social revolution taking place
and to appreciate the political consequences which it por-
tended* Dr. Milton Eisenhower reported to the President,
following his fact-finding visit through Latin America in
1953, that "foreign capital support is indispensable" to
improve the economy of Latin America; a backward economy,
in turn, provided the most fertile field for communist
infiltration and conspiracy. He further reported that
"economic improvement is the greatest single desire of the
4leaders and the peoples of Latin America."
It became apparent that Latin America, indeed, had
a different set of priorities and that combating the
3Arthur P • Whitaker , rhe Western Hemisphere Idea
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954), p. 29,
4Milton S. Eisenhower, "Report to the President:
United States-Latin American Relations , " Department of
State Publication 5290, Inter-American Series 47, December




communist threat did not take precedence over econc
development.
III. LATIN AMERICA VIEWS THE THREAT
At the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas,
Venezuela, 1954, the United States, with the Guatemalan
situation in mind, proposed a discussion of the "Inter-
vention of International Communism in the American
Republics." The delegates from the Latin American repub-
lics showed that they did not share the anxiety of the
United States regarding the threat of Communism, but
seemed to vindicate the assessment of Dr. Eisenhower by
placing a higher priority on massive economic assistance
and reverence for the principle of strict non-intervention.
The United States was present to seek a strong resolution
against communist infiltration. She found unconditional
support in this aim only from Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic, El Salvador, Peru, and Venezuela. Guatemala,
Argentina, and Mexico flatly opposed, however, on the




5J. Lloyd Mechara, Che United States and Inter-
American Security 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas: University
of Texas Press, 1962), pp. 440-443.
6Ibid. t p. 443.
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Secretary of State John Foster Dulles responded to
these non-interventionists , saying, "The slogan of non-
intervention can plausibly be invoiced and twisted to give
immunity to what is in reality flagrant intervention,"
But it was apparent, in any case, that there was little
enthusiasm among the Latin Americans for an anti- communist
resolution • In exacting one by the exertion of great
pressure, the United States incurred strong resentment,
7
even among those who voted in its fa/or.
Professor Lloyd Hecham reserves judgment as to
whether Caracas was a Pyrrhic victory for the United
States, but concedes that , at least, "the Communists
achieved their goal of using the Caracas conference as a
p
propaganda platform.
The Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation
of the Political Integrity of the American States against
the Intervention of International Communism, which emerged,
stated that the domination of any American state by inter-
national communism would constitute a threat to that
state* s sovereignty and independence, endanger the peace
7
Ibid
. , p. 44.
QIbid., p. 445. He also states that by the action
of the Conference "the principle of the Monroe Doctrine
became the common policy of the American republics,' p.
444. A unique placement of a dubious event, if, indeed,
the principle was ever common policy in the Americas.
...
24
of America, and require consultation to decide appropriate
q
action. This language interpreted Article 6 of lio
Treaty in such a way as to make collective measures for
the common defense possible—-even to collective interven-
tion—to protect the principles of American solidarity.
From a juridical point of view, the Declaration of Caracas
could be interpreted as the acquiescence of Latin Americans
in a truly forceful anti-communist policy. It is equally
possible that this interpretation can oe countered by one
which emphasizes the freedom of a state to choose its own
institutions and to determine for itself what domestic
form its politics shall take, Latin America's most effec-
tive and consistent champion of this interpretation and
the principle of non-intervention has been Mexico, who
abstained from voting at Caracas,
Opposition on purely Juridical grounds does not
necessarily explain the heart of the resentment, however.
This legal argumentation seemed to be merely symptomatic
of a more deep-seated dissent. For example, the Mexican
9Department of State, Tenth Inter-American Con-
ference , Caracas , Venezuela , Marc 1-28, l5 4 , Report of
the Delegation of the United States of America with
related documents. Publication No, 5692 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 156-15 7.
A, J, Thomas and Ann V, Thomas, The Organization
of American states (Dallas: Southern Methodist University
Press, 1963), p. 5*29.
11Ibid. t p. 357.
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cultural review, Humanlsmo , commenting on the Caracas
Conference, seemed to reflect the sympathy Latin-American
nationalists, leftists, and intellectuals had for the
Communist Arbenz regime as it faced the highly resented
United States* Referring to the fiery Guatemalan Foreign
Minister Guillermo Torriello Garrido, who so vigorously
opposed the United States, Humanismo effused: MHe inter-
prets the music we like to hear and he attacks the things
we disapprove • ... He saved his country and covered
12himself with glory. r * Professor Keeham quotes an
Uruguayan source from Hoy as stating that they contributed
their approval, but without enthusiasm, optimism, or Joy
and without a feeling of contributing to a constructive
13
measure. Yet another scholar, Robert S. Alexander,
takes the view that the United States used its full weight
to induce the conference to take a position "uncongenial
to the majority of Latin American countries," and in such
a way as to lose friends and alienate the peoples of t
southern part of the hemisphere. He saw Secretary Dulles
as concerned only with the anti-communist resolution and
indifferent both to the Latin American's fear of Yankee
intervention and the concentration of their Interest on






economic and social problems* ofessox
Ronning, expressing a more retrospective view, states
categorically that the Caracas Resolution "has been any-
thing but popular in Latin America."
Against this background of "Conference solidarity,"
which concealed the real fragmentation of consensus about
the nature and urgency of the communist threat to the
hemisphere, the Castro regime in Cuba rejected the prin-
ciple of solidarity with her American neighbors for a
C loser economic and political association with the Sine-
Soviet bloc of nations.
IV. THE CUBAN DEFECTION16
Major Fidel Castro # s revolutionary forces over-
turned the regime of Colonel Fulgencio Batista and pro-
claimed a provisional government in Cuba on January 1,
1959. The fall of a tyrannical dictatorship was lamented
14Alexander, op . clt . , pp. 400-401. Also cited,
with comment, by Mecnam, op . ci.t. % pp. 444-445.
15
-•ale Ronning, Punta del cste : The Limits of
Collective Security in a Troubled Hemisphere (New York:""
Carnegie endowment for TnT ""^ ' I ^eace, 1963), p. 3.
16This sub-chapter is based chiefly upon the chronc
logical recapitulation of U.S.-Cuban relations since
January 1, 1359 in Mezerik (ed.), Cuba and the
United States ( New York ; International Review Service
,
Vol. I, 1960; Vol. II, 1963). These two volumes include
pertinent matter of public record drawn from newspapers,
'
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by almost no one and the promise of new freedom, equality,
and economic and social advancement was welcomed by most
of the peoples of the hemisphere and their governments*
During an unofficial visit to the United States in
April, Castro stated that Cuba was not communist influence*
and would not confiscate foreign private industries* He
laconically asserted, however, that Cuba was not neutral
17in the £ast-West struggle*
At hone, the new revolutionary government dissolved
all existing political parties except the Communist Party
which it legalised* It dissolved the Congress; removed
from office all Governors of Provinces, Congressmen,
Mayors, and Aldermen f suspended the right of habeas corpus;
ruled out new elections} and, by government decree, under-
took sweeping economic and social reforms based on expro-
priated land redistribution*
The first dispute in Cuba's relations with an al-
ready wary and suspicious United States came over compensa-
tion to be paid for American property confiscated under
the Agrarian Reform Law decreed by the Cuban Council of
Ministers* The Cuban Government rejected the note
published documents, and public statements covering a
period to 25 July 1963.
1 7Ibld *. Vol. II, p. 54.
.
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expressing "serious concern" sent by the United States,
replying that it intended to accelerate agrarian reform,
applying equal methods of expropriation and indemnifica-
tion to nationals and foreigners alike, referring any case
in doubt to competent Cuban courts.
The problem of payment for expropriated capital
assets was particularly appalling to nations who had
large investments in Cuba and was an important factor in
turning the tide of Cuban international relations. The
implementation of reforms and anti-capitalist activity
were designed to strengthen the revolution by bettering
the social and economic life of the farmers and workers,
and to achieve economic autonomy in the exploitation of
Cuban natural and foreign developed assets*
Not all strata of Cuban society were supposed to
benefit from these reforms. The anti-capitalist nature of
the revolutionary movement was clear almost from the be-
ginning, as moves were made to take over the mines, mills,
and factories, and to regulate business. Hotels, news-
papers, and commercial establishments were expropriated.
These activities incurred the enmity of Cuban landlords,
business and military men and investors, most of whom fled




new homes. The United States, as the largest single in-
19
vestor in Cuba, became increasingly hostile* In most
Latin American regimes, hostility toward Castro grew apace.
The ruling classes in these countries are made up of the
very groups dispossessed in Cuba, and they began to desi
the overthrow of the Castro Government.
But this was not a unanimous feeling by any means.
Castro had become a hero in the eyes of a large number of
depressed workers and peasants in Latin America by his
actions to give more power and wealth to the poor of his
country and by his challenges to the "Yankee Colossus."
To capitalize this popularity among the peasant classes,
Castro began militant denunciations of the regimes of
other Latin American Republics. His offensive was first
directed against the regimes in Paraguay, Nicaragua, and
the Dominican Republic. A continuing harangue was soon to
be directed against Guatemala, Venezuela, Chile, lombia,
Costa Rica, and Peru. Several of these countries were to
experience covert attacks and infiltrations sponsored by
Cuba to topple their governments and further revolution in
the region. The United States began early to put economic
pressure on the Castro Government, embargoing certain ex-
ports and cutting sugar quotas.
19U.S. Department c mnerce, U.S. Business In-
vestment in Foreign Countries (Washington: overnraent
Printing Office, 1960), p. ^9.
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In February I960, Soviet First Deputy Premier
Anastas Mikoyan, on a visit to Cuba, had concluded trade
and cultural agreements with Premier Castro, The USSR
agreed to supply Cuba with crude oil, petroleum products,
pig iron and steel; to purchase a million tons of sugar
each year for the next five years; and to extend one hun-
dred million dollars in credit. On May 8, the Soviet
Embassy reopened in Havana, resuming diplomatic relations
broken since 1952, In June, Czechoslovakia tendered
twenty million dollars in credit and agreed to provide
20technical assistance* Move and rapid countermove cen-
tered around the sugar quota, the refinement of Russian
crude oil in American-owned refineries, and the final
expropriation of these assets by the revolutionary govern-
ment*
The drift of Cuba toward the communist political
and economic orbit became a flight* Each loss realized by
the reduction of United States investment, trade, aid, and
influence was marked by an increase in communist bloc
participation in Cuban affairs* Closer commercial and
political relations with other communist nations included
Yugoslavia, Poland, and East Germany*
The reliance of Cuba on communist countries was
20Mezerik, Vol* II, 0£. clt * , pp. 55-56*
:
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originally for economic support, but the increasing ten-
sions in the hemisphere, created by the animosity of the
revolutionary government toward her American neighbors,
particularly the United States, made the promise of mili-
21tary aid an important factor. The trend of events in
the now year-and-a-half-old Cuban regime had sorely tempted
the United States to intervene more decisively than with
economic pressures. Castro repeatedly protested against
what he called United States economic intervention to
overthrow the Cuban Revolution, and his charges that armed
attack was intended by the United States were heard in the
22United Nations as early as October 1959.
On July 9, 1960, Chairman Khrushchev promised
23
military aid to Cuba in the event of an attack. The
United States fear that ever closer Cuba-USSR economic and
military ties might result in a Soviet intrusion into the
Western Hemisphere led President Eisenhower to re—emphasize
the Monroe Doctrine, warning that the United States would
never permit "the establishment of a regime dominated by
international communism in the Western hemisphere • "
2 1Ibid . , p. 12. 2 2Ibid ., p. 13.
23USSR Embassy Press Release, No. 330, 9 July 1960,
Washington, 0. C.
2 4Facts on File , Vol. XV, No. 1028, 7-13 July 1960,
New York.

Khrushchev replied, saying: "We consider that the Monroe
Doctrine has outlived itself, has died, so to say, a
25
natural death,"
With this statement, the USSR espoused a policy of
openly participating in Latin America; its military and
economic help to Cuba increased rapidly. Prom this time on
the United States, and with it the Organization of American
States, chose to regard the Soviet Union as the main enemy
and Cuba as its puppet*
This view was obvious in the policy declaration
adopted by the Seventh Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs in San Jose, Costa Rica. "The Declara-
tion of San Jose, 1 ' issued on August 28, 1960, did not
mention Cuba but concentrated on the USSR and Red China.
It condemned "emphatically, intervention or the threat of
intervention, even when conditional, from an extra-
continental power in the affairs of the American Republics
• • • •" It also rejected:
... the attempt of the Sino—Soviet powers to make
use of the political, economic or social situation
of any American State, inasmuch as that attempt is
capable of destroying hemispheric unity and jeo- 26pardizing the peace and security of the hemisphere.
25New York Times , July 13, 1960.
26Text of the Declaration of San Jose quoted in
Mezerik, op_. cit
.
, Vol. I, Appendix C, p. 47.
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By September 2, Cuba was the first American State
to recognize the People's Republic of China* Soon after-
wards, the United States Department of State issued a
report citing "quantities of arms" being delivered from
the Soviet bloc, which included some seventy rocJcet
launchers, MIG fighters, and automatic rifles and sub-
27
machine guns.
On December 31, Cuba asked for an urgent meeting of
the United Nations Security Council to consider evidence
that the United States planned an invasion of Cuba within
a few hours, on what Castro said was the fraudulent pre-
text that Russia was building rocket launching sites
28there. Following an ultimatum that the United States
cut its diplomatic corps in Havana to eleven persons
within forty-eight hours because of its involvement in
"criminal espionage and subversion," President Eisenhower
29broke diplomatic relations on January 3, 1961*
The break in U.S.-Cuban diplomatic relations was
followed in April by the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs inva-
sion. This event, in which the United States admitted its
complicity, opened up a debate in the United States and
27New York Times, November 19, 1960.





resulted in a split international reaction. In Washington,
the leadership of the CIA was changed and a number of in-
vestigations ensued. The Administration was charged with
the failure of the Cuban Brigade. Many United States
allies and those nations in Latin America favoring the idea
of invasion supported this point of view. Criticism was
especially sharp from Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua,
which had hosted the CIA training camps. On the other
hand, sympathy for Cuba and satisfaction with its victory
was also widespread. The communist countries all con-
demned the United States role. Castro sympathizers demon-
strated in Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Venezuela,
Uruguay, and even the United States.
Cuba had made its case against the United States in
a series of meetings before, during, and after the invasion
The United States, and with it almost all its allies,
wanted little United Nations action, preferring—as through-
out the history of the Castro question—to deal entirely
through the OAS, where the African, Asian, and communist
countries do not participate. After debating for eleven
sessions, the General Assembly adopted an inconclusive
resolution which effectively left the United States to




work out action through the 0.A At this juncture, the
United States vigorously renewed her policy of attempting
to isolate Cuba from the inter-American system. The first
step after the failure of the invasion came when the Inter*
American Defense Board of the GAS, meeting in Washington
April 26, 1961, voted to bar Cuba from its secret sessions
on hemispheric defense. The United States had urged the
measure, saying it was necessary in the light of Cuba's
32
"evident military alliance with the Soviet bloc.""
This policy was further enunciated on August 5, in
a statement to Congress by Secretary of State Rusk:
It will be necessary as a first step to ensure
that Castro-type Revolution is insulated from
neighboring countries in the Caribbean ...
the US is consulting with other Latin American
Governments on this. 33
Meanwhile Soviet supplies of armaments to Cuba were
an obvious fact. The profession of communist faith was
explicit in Castro's December 2, 1961, speech:
I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be one until the
day I die • • • • There is no half way between
socialism and imperialism.
He concluded that the Cuban revolution was following "the
31United Nations Document A/Res/1616 (XV) (New
York, April 1961).
3 2Pacts on File . 1961, Vol. XXI, No. 1070, April
27-May 3, 1961, New York.
33Kezerik, o£. cit
•




only honest road, the road of a Socialist and anti-
34imperialist revolution."
Two days later, on December 4, the Council of the
Organization of American States met and adopted a resolu-
tion to convene a Foreign Ministers meeting. The increased
attention being given by the other American States to
Cuba's snow-balling association with the Sino-Soviet bloc
led Premier Castro to reassure his Latin American neighbors
on January 2, 1962:
Our weapons are not offensive weapons and are not
suitable for waging an offensive war jt, • • • Our
weapons are defensive weapons ... /thev7r will
never prejudice the security of any people. 35
This reassurance was not convincing, however, and the
Inter-American Peace Committee of the OAS reported on
January 14, 1962:
The present connections of the Government of Cuba with
the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evidently incom-
patible with the principles and standards that govern
the regional system, and particularly with the collec-
tive security established by the Charter of the OAS
and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. 36
34Quoted in New York Times , December 3, 1961.
35Letter from the Cuban Representative to President
of General Assembly, UN Doc. A/C 1/1866, New York, 1962.
36
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CHAPTER III
MEETING THE THREAT TO HEMISPHERE SOLIDARITY
In spite of a disparity of views about the degree
of urgency of the threat to hemisphere solidarity, Com-
munism had been the target of a series of declarations and
resolutions by the Organization of American States which
recognized its nature and purpose. By 1959, these had
become a part of the inter-American system's defenses
against an external threat to break that solidarity.
With the defection of Castro to Communism, the re-
action was mixed. The external threat had turned to an
internal one. Castroism was not a clearly defined aggres-
sion, but confused with the issues of sovereign rights to
self-determination, nationalism, and the revolution of new
expectations. Thus, enmeshed with principles dear to the
hearts of the Latin American leaders and peoples, a divi-
sion of consensus was bound to occur about both the true
nature of the threat and the action most appropriate to
meet it.
I. THE EVOLUTION OF ANTI-COMMUNIST DECLARATIONS
Professor Mecham asks if the Rio de Janeiro Treaty
of Reciprocal Assistance was aimed at the Soviet

Union? If the viewpoint is merely that of its antecedent,
the Act of Chapultepec, which originally proposed the
treaty in 1945 while Communist Russia was an ally, a nega-
tive answer nw t be given. A positive answer is as much
in order, however, if one considers that the negotiation
of a security agreement against aggression from any source
was the problem at hand. The bitter disappointment and
deep concern of the post-war era stemmed from the Soviet
Union's power politics, opportunism, and ideological ex-
pansionism. The Rio Treaty undoubtedly had the support of
states which had this threat in mind. As surely a factor,
in the minds of most Latin Americans, was the prospect of
acceptance by the United States of a later and more bind-
ing pledge to honor the inviolability of the twenty
smaller and weaker neighbors with whom it shared the
hemisphere.
The Ninth Inter-American Conference at Bogota,
March 1948, was made acutely aware, if not really con-
vinced, of the Communist danger and of the need for col-
lective defense. The alleged communist involvement in the
tragic riots, which took place while the conference met,
contributed to the unanimous approval of the anti—communist
J, Lloyd Mecham, The United states Tnter-
American Security 1889-1960 (Austin, Texas:"" University of
Texas Press, 1962),

resolutions entitled "The Preservation and Defense of
Democracy in America."
This resolution declared that by its anti-democratic
nature and its interventionist tendency, the political
activity of international communism, or any other totali-
tarian doctrine, is incompatible with the concept of
American freedom. It condemned every system suppressing
political and civil liberties, and particularly inter-
national communism, suggesting that governments e .change
information concerning the latter* s activities and measures
for controlling them.
With the advent of the Korean War, the American
attitude of continental solidarity was reaffirmed and re-
inforced by a solid sense of responsibility to both
3
regionalism and the world United Nations organization.
Latin America was in hearty agreement with United Nations
action to brand China an aggressor in Korea and to embargo
4
strategic materials.
2Pan American Union, Organization of /vinerlean . tates
,
Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affair
s
t Serving as Organ of "Consultation in Appllcat Con of
the Inter-American Treaty Reciprocal Assistanc e,
Cste , Uruguay , T§Z2 , Acts (Washington
,
D.C., 1962), OEA/Ser. F/llTST Doc. 2, pp. 24ff. Herein-
after cited as OEA/Ser. f/11.8, Doc.
.
3
Mecharo, 0£. cit . , pp. 429-432.
4John A. Houston, Latin America in the bed
Nations (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, 1956), pp. 120-128.

Because the aggressive policy of international
communism carried out through a Soviet satellite had
brought about an emergency situation which was a threat to
the entire free world, United States requested the
convocation of the Fourth Meeting of Consultation where
efforts were coordinated to meet it by common effort. The
Ministers of Foreign Affairs, meeting in Washington, 1951,
came together to discuss political and military coopera-
tion for the defense of the Americas, cooperation to
strengthen internal security, and emergency economic co-
operation.
The most important action taken was a resolution by
the American republics to remain steadfastly united in I
face of a threat to any one of them, and to close ranks in
the common Interest of providing internal security against
the subversive action of international communism by
strengthening basic democratic institutions. An important
corollary to this declaration was asserted to be the ad-
vancement of the social and economic well-be f the
5people. Professor Mecham has written that the principal
contribution of the meeting was the demonstration of moral
solidarity among the American nations on the ideological
issue of Communism. Consensus on the solidarity of the





Americas threatened by extra—continental Communism n&ver
seemed so high. A year later, the impact of a communist
regime within the hemisphere was to fracture that apparent
solidarity, however, and to make intensely real a situa-
tion which Latin American opinion had heretofore given an
almost cavalier treatment . That is to say, until the
threat actually came to the hemisphere in the form of the
Arbenz regime in Guatemala, the resistance to a threat
from without was idealistically met with declarations.
None of the knotty problems of internal hemisphere security
with their connotations of intervention for the common
defense in the affairs of a sister republic had as yet
been faced.
The spectacular success of international communism
in establishing its ascendancy over the Guatemalan govern-
ment in 1952 was presumably shocking and sobering to a
large number of Latin Americans. Such success in the hemis-
phere, many thought, seemed bound to extend Soviet politi-
cal influence to this continent and greatly endanger its
solidarity; it was in bold defiance of the Hon
The United States saw, understood, and sought action to
prevent this contravention of "American" principles.
Latin Americans saw and understood the situation in quite
another context: that of intervention in the affairs of a
sister republic to combat the communist threat. .art.
.
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was more to be feared than the disease, they were inclined
to believe.
The United States, however, had foresworn unilateral
intervention as it had been practiced in the old days.
High-handed unilateral action had been voluntarily ab-
negated in favor of the broader interest of the American
community and the collective techniques for acting in that
interest. Ambassador John C. Dreier, United States repre-
sentative to the Organization of American States for a
number of years, writes: "Over the years, this country
has gradually relinquished to the organized community of
the Western Hemisphere an increasing share of its capacity
7for decision and action." There remained the test of
collective action in a situation which neither the Rio
Treaty nor any other pact seemed to fit precisely. Thus,
bound to collective intervention, if intervention there
was to be, the United States was brought to exert great
diplomatic pressure upon her smaller neighbors. What was
obtained was a resolution of solidarity against Communism
but no prescription for collective intervention.
In Chapter II, we have already discussed ^he opposi-
tion and resentment encountered by the United States in
7
Johr/ ^er , The organization of American
:




obtaining the resolution it got at Carac***. Suffice it
here to say that a crack in the armor of solidarity was
apparent at that conference. It began to appear that the
principle of non-intervention, as interpreted by Argentina
and Mexico, who abstained from voting at Caracas, was
8dearer to them than American solidarity. This appearance
was considerably heightened in the aftermath of the
Guatemalan affair. Although there was little disposition
to take note of the issue of international communist inter-
vention, the allegation that the powerful United States
maneuvered the overthrow of the government of little
Guatemala became an apparent reality to many Latin Ameri-
cans who seized on it to stir up a veritable hornets 1 nest
of criticism against their powerful neighbor. Here,
indeed, was an illustration of the Latin's concern over
intervention—a concern outweighing any possible realiza-
Q
tion or fear of communist aggression.
As the absence of United States intervention became
known and the truth of the charges of communism against th<
Arbenz regime were verified, this criticism of the Uni
States abated. According to E rofessor Mecham, this rise




9Ibid. t p. 451.

and lack of information on the subject of the communist
threat which the Latins possessed.
Despite the heightened communist activities in
Latin America following the Guatemalan affair, Communists
are not numerous in these states. The danger of com-
munism lies in the intentions and the methods employed by
a monolithic controlled and oriented organization which
successfully infiltrates intellectual circles, student
groups, labor and public-opinion media, exploiting the
Latin's latent anti-Yankee attitudes. It is subservient
to a control external to the Western Hemisphere. It seeks
the subversion of all non-communist society. It has
adopted the practice of deceit in leaguing itself with the
non-communist left and catering to the legitimate aspira-
tions of underdeveloped peoples. 1
The communist success in winning control of the
Cuban revolution and Castro* s subsequent attempts to infil-
trate into other Latin American states was to put an







12Pan American Union, opecial Zonsuitative
on .Security against the Subversive Action Ir."




II. REACTION TO CASTRO IN THE HEMISPHERE
Fidel Castro* s overthrow of Fulyencio Batista »s
harsh dictatorship had been hailed with delight by most
Latin Americans, Castro became the idol of the under-
privileged masses who longed for fundamental social and
economic reforms. The excesses of revolutionary reprisal,
the wholesale expropriation of private property, the sup-
pression of civil rights, and the postponement of consti-
tutional government only partially dimmed the popular
13predilection for the charismatic leader, Castro repre-
sented for a time a revolution which the down-trodden
masses of the American peoples wanted very much to believe
in j he was the Savior of their misery and their hope o
promising future; he rode the crest of a wave which they
hoped would presage a tide upon which would rise the re-
dress of their grievances against the status quo . He was
the symbol of a movement of workers and peasant 10 were
breaking the shackles of serfdom and leading a new nation-




. , p. 455 ; also Boris Goldenber
"The Cuban Revolution: An Analysis," Problems
(Washington, D.C.: United States Information Agency,
XII, No, 5, Sept. -Oct., 1963). This article deals with th€
nature and transformation of the Cuban revo? - • '/ i •
14
an, £. clt . , p, 4
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The excesses of Castro 1 s hate campaign against the
United States, the developing ideological differences with
such leading liberals as Jose* Figueres and Romulo Betan-
court, and his calculated undermining of inter-American
solidarity jed the patience of the Latin Americans to
15grow thin. The result was an increase in tensions in
the Caribbean, with repercussions in the rest of the hemis-
phere which posed a major threat to the inter-American
system. In response to this threat, the iaation of
American States took a series of actions to relieve ten-
sions; to condemn aggression and interventic the
affairs of the American states; and to promote intensified
inter-American cooperation for the improvement of social
and economic conditions in Latin America.
A principal "bad actor" in the Caribbean appeared
to be the Castro government of Cuba. In April 19
Panama claimed it had been invaded by foreign elements
sailing from Cuba. The Representative of Panama on th
Council of the GAS "demanded" the immediate convocation of
the Organ of citation under Article 6 of the Rio




Department of State, Inter-Amer ican orts
Relieve International . in the Wes
195P-1960* ashington/ j. .: ' vernment Printing Off

47
of Consultation, appointed a committee composed of repre-
sentatives of Brazil, the United States, Argentina, Costa
Rica, and Paraguay which verified that the invaders had
17
come from Cuba. In July, the Dominican Republic alleged
that Cuba was a base from which invaders had embarked to
land in Dominican territory and requested Council consid-
18
eration of the issue* In the course of the OAS Council's
discussion of the Dominican request, the Representative of
Haiti proposed orally that a Meeting of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs be convoked on the basis of Articles 39
19
and 40 of the Charter of the OAS to consider the general
situation in the Caribbean area as a problem of an urgent
20
nature and of common interest to the American States.
Specifically, Haiti alleged an invasion of her territory
21by a group coming from Cuba.
July 1962), Department of State Publication 7409, pp. 6-7.
Cited hereinafter as Western Hemisphere Tensions .
1 7Ibid . t p. 9. 18Ibid .. pp. 17-18.
19OAS Charter, Article 39 provides for consultation
on problems of an urgent nature and of common interest;
Article 40 provides that an absolute majority of tht
Council may decide to hold such a meeting.
Western Hemisphere Tensions t op . clt . , p. 18.
21Northwestern University, United States-Latin
American Relations , The Organization of American les ,
a study prepared by Professors George Blanksten, Harold
Guetzkow and John Plank for the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations (Washington; Government Printing Office,
1959), p. 28.

The United States became the diplomatic mediator in
the OAS of various nationalistic face-saving disputes
among the Dominicans, Cubans, Venezuelans, and Haitians-
disputes which dealt generally with the impact of the
revolutionary movement currently exemplified by Castro.
Speaking in the OAS Council, Ambassador John C. Dreier of
the United States observed that the situation in the
Caribbean involved other matters than the various national
cases presented and suggested that a general deterioration
of the situation should be reviewed and that the OAS should
examine the causes thereof and take action to revitalize
22the basic principles of hemispheric solidarity.
The membership of the Council agreed to convoke the
Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign
Affairs at Santiago, Chile, on August 12, 1959. Unlike
the preceding four meetings in the series, this consulta-
tion was not primarily concerned with extra-hemispheric
pressures as the previous war-time meetings had been, but
with meeting disturbing symptoms that had appeared inside
the hemisphere itself. President Jorge Alessandri of
Chile, in his welcoming address at Santiago, declared that
the foundations of our American institutions were hanging




in the Americas, the basic problem of maintaining soli-
23darity might arise* The Santiago meeting marked a
change in the complexion of inter-American consultations,
in the sense that the problems to be discussed were,
indeed, very close to home and involved hemisphere neigh-
bors rather than protagonists strictly alien*
Secretary of State Christian A* Kerter, in an ad-
dress in the Second Plenary Session on August 13, called
the principle of non-intervention the most important
foundation stone of relationships in the inter-American
system* Among the delegates, there was a unanimous
opinion that measures should be avoided which might weaken
this basic pillar of solidarity* On the other hand,
general agreement existed also on the necessity for
strengthening peace and alleviating tensions by measures
adequate to meet new and changing circumstances* He urged
that steps be taken in such a way as to strengthen respect
for representative democracy and human rights* Notwith-
standing their belief in non-intervention, some of the
Foreign Ministers expressed the view that the principle
needed to be adjusted and harmonised with the democracy
and human rights principles also basic to the solidarity
24
of the Americas* The dilemma confronting the meeting
2 3Ibld *. p* 24. 24Ibld*. p. 28.
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was how to preserve non-intervention as the guarantee of
the sovereignty and independence of the American states
yet | at the same time, adopt practical measures to effect
the goals of democracy and respect for human rights in the
hemisphere.
The Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Mexico, Brazil,
Argentina, and Uruguay presented arguments that reflected
serious consideration of the dilemma, but in each case
took the position that non-intervention must not be com-
25promised in the slightest degree. A reconciliation of
measures to promote democracy and human rights with the
principle of non-intervention was never achieved. Rather,
the former were reaffirmed in Resolutions III, VIII, IX,
and X adopted by the meeting, but remained subordinate to
the supreme principle of non-intervention, which was also
26
reasserted by Resolutions II, V, and VII. Increased
economic development was the technique recommended to
further human rights and democracy. By this approach,
more direct intervention was avoided. Cuba, Brazil, and
Bolivia made strong appeals for increased Pan American
economic cooperation, and they were merely the outstanding







economic underdevelopment as the obstacle to all aspira-
tions. The meeting ad a resolution which urged
member states to speed implementation of economic develop-
27
raent measures already undertaken.
Despite the resolutions adopted at the Fifth Meeting
of Consultation, events were to aggravate rather than
lessen international tensions in the Caribbean affecting
American solidarity. The Dominican Government engaged in
virulent subversive and propaganda activities against
Venezuela—activities which led to the Convocation of a
Sixth Meeting of Consultation at San Jose*, Costa Rica, in
28August 1960, In the same month, a separate and distinct
Seventh Meeting followed at the same site, to consider the
deterioration of United States-Cuban relations.
The attitude of the governments of Cuba and the
United States had become mutually hostile and even provoca-
tive toward one another. A series of confiscatory actions
against United States trade and investment in Cuba was
coupled with the engagement of Cuban diplomatic officials
and agents in interventionist activity to promote revolu-
tion against existing governments in other Latin American
states. The United States cut Cuba's sugar quota. Of




28Ibid ,, pp. 65-70.

of the Castro Government toward the Sino-Soviet bloc and
the threat of Soviet military intervention made by Chair-
man Nikita Khrush a Moscow speech on July 9, I960.
A general concern over this latter fact was expressed in a
note of July 13 to the Council of the OAS by the Represen-
tative of Peru. It requested the convocation of a Meeting
of Consultation for the purpose of considering the exigen-
cies of hemisphere solidarity, the defense of the regional
system, and the defense of American democratic principles
in the face of threats that might affect them.
In session to consider the request, the Council of
the OAS heard Peruvian Ambassador Juan Bautista de Lavalle
declare:
... we are witnessing the development of a plan
for subverting the republican institutions of America
... for instigating disorder and instability in its
internal political life, and for disturbing by means
of propaganda, pressure, or threats the right of
peoples to govern themselves. 30
On July 29, the Council approved the recommendations
of a preparatory committee that the meeting be held at San
Jose. In a three-day debate on the issues all the Latin
American countries, with the exception of Cuba, unanimously
condemned any attempt by the Sino-Soviet powers to
29
Ibid., p. 221.




intervene In the affairs of the hemisphere. They generally
agreed that such an a t could only be intended to
implant the alien Communist political system and ideo]
in the Americas and, therefore, posed a great threat to
31the inter-American system and its individual members.
With respect to Cuba, however, opinions differed as
to the extent of that country's involvement in Soviet
designs and the degree to which it constituted a danger to
the peace and security of the hemisphere. Furthermore,
most of the countries expressed the greatest concern over
the threat to hemisphere solidarity resulting from the
controversy between Cuba and the United States. In the
opening debate, Peruvian Foreign Minister Raul F arras
Barrenechea, in explaining the spirit of absolute neu-
trality and conciliation in which his government had
requested the meeting, declared that Peru deplored the
worsening tensions between Cuba and the United states, the
reprisals adopted by one side or the other, and their
aggravation by the intervention of Chairman Khrushchev.
He declared that he could not conceive, however, of Cuba
becoming the satellite of any power and expressed confidence
that the Cuban revolution would not be diverted from its
32









Mexico advised patience with the Cuban revolut
and rejected any collective action endangering the prin-
33
ciple of non-intervention . Venezuela criticized the
United States for past actions taken against Cuba and
attributed them to the influence of an intense propa-
ganda campaign encouraged by covert interests •" It also
criticized Cuba for its immoderate attacks on the United
States. Venezuela supported a Colombian proposal for the
establishment of a committee to lend good offices in the
dispute and believed that the meeting should condemn all
forms of intervention, ratify the principle of self-
determination of peoples, and approve the unquestioned
35
right of Cuba to develop freely its own revolution.
Somewhat out of context, the Brazilian representa-
tive asserted that he regarded the economic underdevelop-
ment of Latin America as the basic and underlying threat
to the political solidarity of the hemisphere and proposed
that the Council of the CAS draw up a draft supplementary
protocol to the Rio Treaty concerning economic cooperation
33Ibid., p. 72.
34Ibid., quoted on p. 74. Department ate
translation.
35 Ibid.
, pp. 331-336. Department of State trans-
lation. OAS Official Records, OSA/Ser.F/11. 7 (Spanish),
Doc. 59, August 25, 1960, pp. 2-7.

for submission to c omlng Eleventh Inter-American
Conference.
These several views indicate the nature of differ-
ence between United States and Latin onerican assessments
of the situation and the action which it seemed to indi-
cate as necessary to the various states of the hemisphere.
For the United States, Secretary of State Christian A.
Herter expressed the conviction that the meeting should
rigorously condemn Soviet intervention and indicate its
grave concern over Cuba's toleration and encouragement of
such intervention. He urged the Conference to call for
effective resistance to interventionist efforts by the
37Sino-Soviet bloc in America.
Notwithstanding this diversity of views expressed
in the general debates, the Declaration of San Jose con-
demned the intervention by an extra—continental power in
the affairs of any American republic. The resolution was
adopted unanimously by nineteen countries (Cuba and the
Dominican Republic being absent). It did not mention
Cuba by name anywhere in its text. In explaining their
votes in favor of the Declaration, the Venezuelan, Mexican,
36
Ibid., pp. 298-304. Department of State transla-
tion of GEA/Ser.F/11.7 (Spanish), Doc. 16, August 23,
1960, pp. 3-11.
37Ibid. t pp. 315-325.
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and Bolivian Foreign Ministers stressed that the resolu-
tion was not to be considered hostile to, or condemnatory
of, Cuba. The govei of Guatemala and Nicaragua,
however, stated that they would have preferred a stror
stand against the menace of international communist inter-
vention through Cuba. This Conference marks a signifi-
cant dichotomy of views which was to intensify in the
future.
But the reaction to Castro and Communism in the
hemisphere was not confined entirely to anti-communist
declarations. As has been noted, the recurring t
economic development was seen as a positive method for
ultimately denying a victory of revolutionary change to
the Communists. Therefore, the adoption by the Act of
Bogota of a program of social and economic progress was
another form of reaction to the threats imperiling American
39
solidarity. Adopted at that third meeting of the Com-
mittee of twenty-one, held at Bogota, Colombia, Sept
5-13, I960, this Act took steps to implement economic
programs to improve conditions for the mass of peoples of
Latin America and to fulfill a promise of a better life






intent, was the Alliance for Progress inaugurated at Punta
del Este, Uruguay, in August 1961.
III. A HEMISPHERE DIVIDED ON REMEDIAL ACTION
A proliferation of declarations against Communism
and for the implementation of long-term economic programs
were insufficient to reverse a trend which seemed destined
to render permanent a cleavage of the historic solidarity
of the Americas. Hence, vigorous and immediate remedial
action was seen by many American states as imperative if
solidarity was to be restored. The United States was fore-
most among this faction. A distinctly reticent faction,
however, tended to divide opinion on what remedies, if any,
were appropriate. The law and politics of the inter-
American system were to show the extent to which diversity
still existed in the presence of an effort at unified
action.
The Colombian delegation presented a note to the
Council of the Organization of American States, on November
14, 1961, calling for a Meeting of Consultation of the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Its proposal was made under
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty "in order to consider threats
to the peace and to the political independence of the
American states that might arise from the intervention of
extra-continental powers seeking to break inter-American
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solidarity." The note went on to say that the meeting
requested should:
Point out the various types of threats to the peace
or certain acts that, if they occur, justify the
application of measures for the maintenance of the
peace and security, pursuant to Chapter V of the
Charter of the Organization of American States and
the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of
Reciprocal Assistance .40
The Rio Treaty makes provisions for action to
counter aggression of two kinds: armed attack; and acts,
facts, or situations that do not constitute an armed
attack but constitute a threat to peace. There are cer-
tain antecedents which should be reviewed here to establish
the background of legality of the meeting requested by
Colombia.
Presently, inter-American solidarity and its pro-
tection by a system of collective security stems from
certain principles and procedures that the American re-
publics agreed upon at Buenos Aires in 1936, where it was
declared that "every act susceptible of disturbing the
peace of America affects each and every one of them, and
41justifies" consultation. Two years later, at Lima in
1938, this declaration was repeated and consultation made
an obligation. At Havana, in 1940, the Consultation of
40HW0EA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 3.
410EA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 2, p. 4.
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Ministers extended the principle of solidarity to "any
attempt on the part of a non-American State" against the
integrity of the territory or political independence of an
American State, declaring that such an attempt "shall be
considered an act of aggression" against all the States
42
signing the declaration*
The Treaty of Rio, 1947, made official and formal
the foregoing principles and incorporated in treaty form
the methods and procedures of the collective security
system adopted on a war-time basis at Mexico City in 1945*
The preamble of the former considered again not only "acts
of aggression" but also "threats of aggression" against
any State, by any State, American or extra-continental.
Remedies included breaking of relations} interrupting
economic, commercial, and financial relations; and the use
of armed force to repel or prevent aggression. It should
be noted that in Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and Article
25 of the Charter of the OAS, acts and facts or situations
that do not constitute an armed attack are foreseen and
the Organ of Consultation is strengthened with competence
to define them and to affect measures to meet them. These




rights | democracy, and other aspects of the "political
43defense of the Hemisphere."
The Meeting of Consultation requested by Colombia
would be competent to consider those acts, facts or situa-
tions that presently constituted "threats" originating
from the intervention of international communism in America.
Ample precedent had been established during the Second World
War and following it, by the convocations of Consultation
which considered and defined certaia acts, facts or situa-
tions of the same kind as those contemplated by the con-
vocation requested. The "aggressive nature" of communism
had already been declared an "intervention in the affairs
of the Americas" at Caracas in 1954 and the Punta del Este
meeting was to determine the measures advisable to take
for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Con-
tinent.
Article 6 of the Rio Treaty dealt with the second
type of aggression, and this was the article to be in-
voked against Cuba. In view of the Juridical arguments to
be raised in the Council considering the Colombian note,
it bears citing in full:
If the inviolability or the integrity of the
territory or the sovereignty or political
43,Pan American Union, Report of the Rapporteur of the
Second Committee of the Rio Conference , Doc. 7T3T57
24, 30 August 19477 "Washington , D . c
.
-
independence of any American State should be af-
fected by an aggression which is not an armed
attack or by an extra-continental or intra-
continental conflict, or by any other fact or
situation that might endanger the peace of America,
the Organ of Consultation shall meet immediately
in order to agree on the measures which must be
taken in case of aggression to assist the victim
of the aggression or, in any case, the measures
which should be taken for the common defense and
for the maintenance of the peace and security of
the Continent. 44
In the discussions of the Council as to whether a
Meeting of Consultation should be called, the Representa-
tive of Mexico argued that the interpretation his govern-
ment placed upon the terms of the Treaty required that
there be not only a "threat to the pea ;ut a "threat to
the peace that affects the inviolability or the integrity
of the territory or the sovereignty or political independ-
ence" of an American state. The Mexican Government's
representative further opined that the element of "urgency 1
required by the Rio Treaty was lacking. He argued, fur-
thermore, that the Colombian note made no reference to any
fact that would bring the situation clearly within the
restrictive nature of Article 6 (i.e., presumably some-
thing affecting the inviolability or the integrity of the
44Department of State, Inter-American Zonference
for the Maintenance of Peace and ecurityT
"
PuE
No. 3016, International Conference eries II (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1948).
-
territory, so that the convocation of a consultative
45
meeting was tantamount to an extension of the Treaty).
Mexico was not alone. The Chilean delegate con-
tributed a further point to the Mexican argument.
Colombia, he observed, had asked for a Meeting of Consul-
tation "to consider the threats to the peace ... that
might arise" and to decide what should be done "if they
occur." This, he submitted, only served to stress that no
such threat had occurred, as yet; and since the Treaty
authorized a meeting only when toe situation existed
,
46there was no legal basis for calling a meeting.
Thomas and Thomas are of the opinion that the word
might renders "Article 6 most e> 30 that it covers
present and actual as well as possible situations that
might threaten the peace." They confess that the use of
the word might in the Colombian note was unfortunate and
obtuse in a desire to incur less argument among the Council
membership, but conclude that the terminology of Article 6
is broad enough to cover the situation to which it was
directed. As for the Mexican argument, they contend that
it had little legal merit. 47
45OEA/Ser. G/II/C-2-427; OBA/Ser. F/11.8, Doc. 25
(Spanish), pp. 83-89.
46OSA/Ser. G/II/C-2-427, pp. 34ff.
47A. J. Thomas and Ann V. Thomas,
_
: _ - . -^

63
. Neale Ronning, pointing out that the reference
in Article 6 to "any act or situation that might endanger
the peace,'' would support two different interpretations in
Spanish and Portuguese by their differing uses of the
present subjunctive. He believes that even a French ver-
sion does not provide the definitive interpretation one
48hopes for in the language of diplomacy.
A S&ckground Memorandum on the Convocation of the
meeting was prepared by the Department of Legal Affairs of
the Pan American Union, hoping, apparently, to resolve the
legal doubts before the opening of the Meeting of Consul-
tation. It argued that by pr id the intent of the
drafters, the Rio Treaty should extend in application to
49the situation under discussion*
Most of the delegates seemed to ignore the actual
wording of the Colombian note and argued that the threats
50
outlined in Article 6 actually did exist. The United
States delegate, Ambassador de Lesseps S. Morrison,





• Neale Ronning, I unta del £ste : The Limits of
Collective Security in a Troubled HemTspfiere (Mew York:""
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 8.
H




insisted that a situation not only might but actually <
exist which endangers the peace of America; a flagrant
subversion does involve danger to the political independ-
ence of the American states. Under the circumstances,
it wculd seem to have been preferable to adjust the word-
ing of the Draft Resolution to state clearly that the
purpose for calling the meeting was to consider a situa-
tion that actually did endanger the peace. As it stood,
the Draft Resolution of the Council, then under considera-
tion, repeated the same wording used in the Colombian
note, and the arguments made during its discussion were
quite out of context with the reasons stated for calling
the meeting in the first place.
Former Ambassador John C. Dreier stated, in a lec-
ture at The American University in the fall of 1963, that
one or two governments that were willing to go along with
the verbally expressed, but usually unpubllcized, reasons
for calling the meeting, prefer. eave the Resolution,
which would be published, in the weaker form. Professor
Ronning confirms this reason for not changing the wording
of the Resolution, on the basis of suggestions made t<
by a number of Latin Americans that a change might have
-vJ ilXui
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THE INTER-AMERICAN RESPONSE AT PUNTA DEI
A note of urgency appeared in the remarks
Uruguayan Foreign Minister Homero Martinez Montero as he
welcomed the American Ministers to Punta del Este on
January 22, 1962. In his opening address, he said:
This whole system seems to be going into crisis.
Impartial and calm examination of the situation
leads to the conclusion that, In spite le
aspirations and a multitude of wellfounded decla-
rations • • • today, as neve before ..." am-
bers are aware that the united destiny of the
hemisphere has deep fissures in it that threaten
the strength of the organization*
1
The meeting had been called to deal with alleged
threats to hemispheric peace, threats created by develop-
ments within Cuba. We have seen how the differing inter-
pretations of th cedents and legal issues
of the case divided the hemisphere and raised a serious
question as to whether the in cican system would be
able to meet the challenge. The meeting was prejudged by
some as an historic one; by others, as foredoomed to
insipidity in word and devoid of any action save that of
Pan American Union. Orgar
States , eighth Meeting of Consultation 67 Ministers of
Foreign Affairs , ervinq as Organ "onsultatlon in"
"
Application oFthe [nter-Anerlcan Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance , Punta deT £ste t Uruguay , 195 c" T anc
Documents , (Washington? Government Printing oFfice, 19c

67
demonstrating the weakening condition of the inter-American
system. Subsequent events have only partially proved the
accuracy of either prognosis but have demonstrated the
2
mutual compatibility of both.
Since a large and important bloc of Latin American
countries abstained from voting in the Council on the
Resolution to convene the meeting, it is perhaps surprising
that it was decided to have a meeting at all* These five
nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Bolivia, and Ecuador)
3
represented more than half of the Latin population, me
observers believed that the United States should have
waited until more time could be devoted to winning the
approval of at least one of these states, A large number
of meetings between President Frondizi of Argentina and
the Kennedy Administration suggest that a special effort
4
was made to win over this nation. The military in
Argentina had especially adamant anti-Castro sentiments,
5for example; and the Unit
,
having knowledge of




G. Connell-Smith, "The Future of the OAS , " The
world Today , Vol. 18, No. 3 (March, 1962), p. 112.
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U. S. Congress, Senate, Record of the 87tb Congrc.
Second Session (2 February 1962), p. 1391.
4Connell-Smith, op_. cit . , pp. 117-118.
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C. Neale Ronning, el Este:
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this attitude, had apparently entertained some hope of
that country's support at Punta del Este.
The existence of two blocs among the assembled
delegations became the chief item of news and also of con-
cern as soon as the Foreign Ministers assembled on 22
January 1962. One bloc favored sanctions against the
government of Cuba, This group included the United States,
the Dominican Republic, Colombia, Venezuela, Paraguay,
Peru, and the Central American countries. The others
generally opposed sanctions. This bloc included Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, and Mexico, In the case
of at least two republics, Haiti and Uruguay, there ap-
peared to be no irrevocable alignment with either side.
Both had voted for convening the meeting, but neither one
7had indicated clearly what its position would be.
That two such blocs existed had, of course, been
known since the OAS Council voted to call the meeting.
But when the ministers finally assembled for their task,
the hard fact of these two blocs and the possible conse-
quences of the dichotomy became discouragingly apparent.
Collective Security in a_ Troubled Hemisphere (New York:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1963), p. 14,
Connell-Smith, o£. cit
. , p. 118.
7Ronning, o£. cit . , p. 14,
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Some members of the delegations opposing sanctions empha-
sized "privately" that they were prisoners of domestic
political forces. In light of this fact, it was soon
apparent that their positions could not be changed easily,
p
in some cases, were not even open to compromise. There
was little doubt as to the sympathy of the United States,
however,
I. THE UNITED STATES POSITION
In the United States, the case against the Castro
regime had been building for many months, and the position
of that government was a secret to no one. It believed
that the present situation in Cuba confronted the Western
Hemisphere and the inter-American system with a grave and
urgent challenge. This challenge did not result from the
fact that the Castro government in Cuba was established by
revolution, but that the revolutionary regime had betrayed
its promise and delivered the revolution into the hands of
powers alien to the hemisphere, perverting freedom and
democracy into a mechanism for the destruction of free in-
stitutions. The seizure by international communism of a
base and bridgehead in the Americas was a disruption of




stated the United States view:
It is the considered judgment of the Government of
the United States of America that the Castro regime
in Cuba offers a clear and present danger to the
authentic and autonomous revolution of the Americas
—
to the whole hope of spreading political liberty,
economic development, and social progress through
all the republics of the hemisphere.^
This publication of views had been followed in the fall of
1961 with another U.S. State Department White Paper which
was not dissimilar to that cited above. A brief document,
it discussed the developments in the Cuban situation sub-
sequent to the Sixth Meeting of Consultation held in
August 1960, and was apparently presented to the Inter-
American Peace Committee by way of evidence and assistance
to that body.
While the White Paper called for no action, it was
clearly intended to prove the existence of a threat re-
quiring the collective action of the American states. It
reiterated two points which formed the basis of its whole
case against Castro. First, it claimed that the Castro
regime had established such extensive and intimate ties
with the Sino-Soviet countries as to render Cuba an
9Department of State, Cuba (Washington: Government
Printing Office, April 1961), Publication 7171, Inter-
American Series 66, pp. 1-2.
U.S. Department of State, The Castro Regime in
Cuba (Washington, August 1961). (MimeographedTT

appendage of the communist system. Second, it urged that
Cuba must now be considered a Sino-Scviet beachhead in th<
hemisphere serving the objectives of international Commun-
ism. 11
The first point was well made, portraying an exist-
ing situation rather than arguing a particular course of
action. The second point was most closely related to the
charge made by Peru, which had set in motion the study of
the Inter-American Peace Committee to be discussed later.
The situation, described explicitly in the White Paper,
fell within the scope of the Rio Treaty, as it dealt with
the inviolability and territorial integrity of sovereign
states.
The case was weak on two counts, however, First,
the Department of State charged Castro with attempting to
spread revolution by "example," But to say that a gov
ment is a threat to the peace simply by existing does not
sound very convincing. The White Paper, therefore, re-
ferred to more concrete examples:
It /the Castro regime"7 is bringing hundreds of stu-
dents, labor leaders, intellectuals and dissident
political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and
training to be sent back to their countries for the
double purpose of agitating in favor of the Castro
regime and undermining establishment in other Latin




Solidarity with the Cuban devolution" for the same
dual purpose* ;>an diplomatic personnel encourage
and finance agitation and subversi n by dissident




Professor Kooning observes that these kinds of
activities, while they may threaten the peace, least re-
quire collective action* Sovereign states threatened by
the exchange of students, labor leaders, and intellectuals
would have it in their power to take unilateral action*
The use of diplomatic personnel for subversive purposes
could be prevented by declaring them personaenon gratae
or by breaking diplomatic relations* Indeed, some govern-
ments most concerned about Castro* s activities had already
severed diplomatic ties before the time of the Punta del
Cste Meeting*
Another document figured widely in preparing the
case against Castro t The 14 January 1962 Report of the
Inter-American Peace Committee* On November 27, 1961,
Peru had requested an investigation by the committee,
charging (1) that the Cuban Government had become incor-
porated into the 5ino-5oviet bloc, (2) that it was guilty
of infiltration and subversion in other American states,
and (3) that it was denying certain fundamental human
1 2Ibld *. p. 22*




rights to its citizens and to foreigners. An investiga-
tion was authorized and carried out by the committee. The
publication of its report, just over a week before the
conference opened, did not substantially strengthen the
15United States position, * It contained much more evidence
of ties between Cuba and the Communist bloc and violations
of human rights than it did of the Castro regime's alleged
subversive actions which could be termed aggression under
the Rio Treaty,
On the first point, the report proved the existence
of Cuban-Sino-Soviet ties by citing official Cuban declara-
tions, Cuban votes in the United Nations, and the fact
that Cuba had received military supplies from the Sino-
16Soviet bloc. The committee asserted that this identifi-
cation with the Communist bloc was "antagonistic to the
principles established in the Charter of the Organization
17
of American States •" As self-evident as this point may
have been to the American governments, a vast segment of
public opinion may have required more convincing evidence
of the fact.
As for the subversive activities of the Cuban
140EA/Ser.F/ll,8, Doc. 3, p. 18.
15Connell-Smith, o£. cit








government, the committee prefaced its findings with the
following statement:
The Inter-American Peace Commit for its part,
does not have all the elements necessary for carry-
ing out an exhaustive investigation in this field.
Consequently, it has had to restrict itself to
notoriously public facts and the reports that the
governments of America have provided it. 1^
The evidence that followed was confined almost exclusively
to instances where Cuban diplomatic agents had been ex-
pelled because of improper interventions in the domestic
affairs of the countries to which they were accredited.
The list included mostly countries whose di/ omatic
history showed such charges to be a commonplace occurrence,
In respect to the cases cited, the report con-
cluded:
The cases enumerated, as well as others about which
the Committee has not been able to gather complete
information, or in which Cuban diplomatic officials
left the countries to which they were accredited
because of public accusations of intervention, reveal
a situation that has caused many governments to con-
sider the diplomatic missions of Cuba as centers
agitation and subversive propaganda.^
The committee concluded that such activities "would con-
stitute acts that within the system for the 'political
defense* of the Hemisphere, have been classed as acts of







1 9Ibid ., p. 32.
20* uIbid., p. 40.
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Professor Ronning is severe in his criticism of
this portion of the committee's report, raising the ques-
tion whether the finding to the effect that Cuba was
guilty of Mpolitical aggression" was supported by the
evidence. He rightly contends that there is more at stake
here than the Cuban case. Present and future attitudes
regarding the nature of the OAS are, indeed, also involved.
He observes:
When nearly all evidence is prefaced by such state-
ments as "many governments accuse" and "various
governments have reported" and when a committee
admits that it has been unable to carry out an
"exhaustive investigation" and adds to this other
cases "about which the Committee has not been able
to gather complete information," it is not likely
that the stature of the Organization will be en-
hanced as a result, 21
It is not certain that a more careful investigation
and report by the Peace Committee would have altered
either the basis or th tion of the American states
Meeting on Consultation, But it is apparent that the re-
port, as submitted, was not a strong factor in the case
against Cuba,
The final action of the meeting was not predicated
so much on "political aggression" or "causes of inter-
national tensions"—causes which are clearly within the
scope of the Rio Treaty—as they were on Cuban-Sino-Soviet
Ronning, o£, cit , t p, 13,
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ties. "Incompatible" with and "antagonistic" to the
regional principles expressed in the Charter were the
premises upon which the Cuban case was forced within the
22
scope of the Treaty. Secretary of State Dean Rusk had
let it be known that the United States sought sanctions
against the Cuban Government; but among all the countries
of Latin America, only the Central American nations de-
manded strong action on the part of the Foreign Ministers.
II. THE ATTITUDE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN STATES
The Central American demands were presented to the
ministers in a joint resolution of the Republics of Costa
23Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua.
The projected resolution charged:
The systematic intervention of the Cuban Government
in the internal affairs of the American republic is
seriously affecting their sovereignty and political
independence, and a communist regime that serves the
political interests of extra-continental powers and
lends itself as an instrument of subversion in
America has been implanted in the aforesaid island,
all of which constitutes an imminent danger to the
peace and security of the Hemisphere. 24
Accordingly, they requested a resolution which would label








requiring action under the Rio Treaty. The Central Ameri-
can states asked that, in conformity with the Treaty, it
be resolved to ( 1 ) suspend the Government of Cuba from
participating in the Organs of the OAS; (2) to rupture
diplomatic and economic relations between member states
and Cuba; (3) to empower the OAS Council to decide by two-
thirds vote when Cuba would return to the inter-American
system; and (4) to transmit the text of this resolution to
25
the United Nations Security Council.
The opposition to the sanctions proposed by the
Central Americans was formidable. Their Foreign Ministers
insisted, however, that they would consider leaving the
conference if there was no agreement on collective action
against the Cuban regime; moreover, they informed Secre-
tary Rusk that if the inter-American system proved unable
to ensure adequate defensive measures against Cuba, they
would ask the United States to conclude a Caribbean re-
26gional defense pact with them.
An Uruguayan observer at the Punta del Este Con-
ference wrote of the Central American countries:
... they resolved to maintain themselves firm
on the "hard line." There were no dissenters,
25Ibid.
, pp. 3-5.
26Keesing's Contemporary Archives , 21-28, April
1962, pp. 18 and 713.
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The linea dura or "hard line" advocated was that
the maximum sanctions possible be imposed on Cuba by the
American states. This adamant position of the Central
Americans seemed to make compromise very difficult.
A bloc of Latin republics opposed the extreme posi-
tion of the Central Americans and were equally adamant in
rejecting the imposition of sanctions. Before the general
commission met on January 24, a compromise memorandum had
been circulated by the Republics of Argentina, Brazil,
Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Haiti, and Mexico. It was of
quite a different character from the Central American
draft resolution which had followed it. The memorandum
endorsed by this group of seven proposed that the confer-
ence should (1) formally denounce "the subversive activi-
ties of international Communism" and declare the
incompatibility of Marxism-Leninism with the inter-American
system; but, (2) it proposed that it should merely study
the measures to be taken in view of this incompatibility,
including the question of Cuban membership in the Inter-
American Defense Board and the supply of arras to Cuba;
and finally, (3) that it should consider the long-term
27




question of "whether it will be necessary to revise the
Charter" of the OAS to permit the suspension or expulsion
of a member country. Declaring their belief that "the
suggested procedure is adequate for reaching an agreement
on an amply satisfactory basis," the seven republics
stressed that "none of them will vote in favor of immedi-
ate or deferred application of any of the measures
—
-t 28/sanctions/ listed in Article 8 of the" Rio Treaty.
These two opposing views, supported by a bloc split, ob-
viously denied the United States a required two-thirds
majority in the OAS for its policy of sanction against
Cuba and comprised a decided division in American soli-
darity. But even before the meeting, the United States
Department of State had seen that a fall-back position was
necessary and, giving up hope of a resolution calling for
a break in diplomatic relations with Cuba, now searched
for a compromise which would restore the rule of unanimity
to inter-American meetings.
III. UNANIMITY VERSUS SANCTIONS
The task of the meeting became one of finding what
common ground might exist for a compromise formula which
would emphasize points of agreement and, at the same time,
28Keesing's, op_. cit
. , pp. 18 and 713.
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minimize the degree of discord among the assembled dele-
gations.
Since most of the negotiations and discussions took
place behind closed doors, reliance was placed principally
on the official acts and documents of the meetings,
statements made during the General Committee sessions
provide relatively clear maximums of demand and possible
concession at the meeting*
The delegation of Argentina was particularly active
in finding some ground common to all delegations* The
domestic political forces which made public pronouncement
in favor of sanctions so dangerous for a number of govern-
ments has already been mentioned* Argentina, it will be
recalled, was among theac. The Frondizi -government was
faced with the pressures brought to bear by Argentina *s
armed forces who favored strong measures against Castro*
On the other hand, important elections were only about a
month away, and action against Castro could favor the
growing opposition to Frondlsi from Peronist and labor
sources. learly, a compromise at Punta del £ste was
preferable for the incumbent regime in Argentina*
Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Carcano emphasised, with
more force than any of his colleagues, the importance of
29Ronning, op * cit . . p* 17.
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avoiding an open split in the CAS, expressing great con-
cern over the danger of pushing the inter-American system
30beyond its limits.
The United States found it necessary to find a way
to keep united those countries favoring sanctions and, at
the same time, garner additional votes to fill out a two-
thirds majority from among the less committed delegations.
The Central American states had indicated that the least
they would settle for was expulsion of Cuba from the OAS,
A shift in the Argentine position always seemed possible
31
and could affect the votes of Chile, Ecuador, or Bolivia.
It was inevitable that the economic facet should
figure in the Punta del Este Meeting, as it had in almost
every previous inter-American conference. It was rea-
sonable, too, to expect that at this meeting, where domes-
tic political pressures were accorded repeated verbal
deference, the United States might be obliged to point out
some domestic political realities of its own.
The connection between United States economic power
and United States political desires seemed inescapable.
Barely six months earlier, at this very site, the Alliance
for Progress had been launched as a policy for combating
30OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 42 ( espanol ) , p. 9,
31Ronning, op_. cit . , p. 18.
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the communist bid to win the social and economic revolu-
tion in the hemisphere. Special White House Assistant to
President John F. Kennedy, Richard Godwin, in statements
to the press, had pointed out that the United States
Congress had to vote funds for the Alliance and that it
32
was also pressing for action against Cuba, The Latin
American press was aware of this connection, and items of
news and commentary illustrated their consideration of its
33
significance.
The address to the conference by Secretary of State
Dean Rusk referred immediately to the Alliance for Prog-
ress:
For the second time in six months, the nations of
the Americas meet here in pursuit of their common
goal—social progress and economic growth within
a community of free and independent nations. But
this time we come to take measures to safeguard that
freedom and independence—so that in the future we
may devote all our efforts to social progress and
economic growth .34
Secretary Rusk dwelled at length upon the plans of the
Latin countries for houses, schools, factories, roads and
dams; he said that the United States had already made




33 #La Prensa (Buenos Aires), 23 January 1962; El Dia
(Montevideo) 24 January 1962; La Nacion (Buenos AiresT,""
29 January 1962.
34OEA/Ser.F/11.8, Doc. 35, p. 1.

have no difficulty in meeting the more than 1 billion
dollars pledged for the first year of the Alliance for
35Progress •" Throughout his speech he stressed the Alli-
ance and argued that it, not communism, symbolized the tj
wave of the future.
Milton Eisenhower has interpreted Secretary Rusk':
speech in this way: "It was clear that the United State;
was tying its promise of economic aid to Latin America t<
36the actions at Punta del Este." Gordon Connell-Smith
described the situation as one in which "United States
prestige was at stake, for the conference was seen as a
contest between the United States and Cuba; the Alliance
37for Progress versus Castroism,
"
Whatever the fact of the matter, the United State;
delegation knew beforehand that the hemisphere was split
on the Cuban issue, that such unblushing pressure as was
applied at Caracas in 1954 would not establish a necessaj
consensus, and that only the most subtle and restrained
diplomacy would suffice in the face of the strong non-
interventionist sentiments existent among the republics.
35Ibid., p. 2. (Italics this writer's.)
36Milton S. Eisenhower, The Wine is
York: Doubleday and Co. 3), p. 325.
37Conne 11-Smith, op_. :it
. , p. 118.

Secretary Rusk's speech was vigorous and pointed in
its attack on Cuba and communism in the hemisphere, and
explicit in the remedies called for against each. He
dealt at length with the complexion of the Cuban regime
and the threat which its close ties with the Sino-Soviet
bloc portended for the hemisphere. Setting up the United
States proposals for action against Cuba, he said:
I suggest we move in four directions. First, we
must recognize that the alignment of Cuba with the
Sino-Soviet countries ... are incompatible with
the purposes and principles of the inter-American
system ... and are an ever present danger to the
peace and security of the continent. Second, we
must make the policy decision to exclude the Castro
regime from the organs and bodies of the inter-
American system /Including specifically the Inter-
American Defense Board"7. Third, we must interrupt
the limited but significant flow of trade between
Cuba and the rest of the hemisphere, especially the
traffic in arms. Fourth, we must set in motion a
series of individual and communal acts of defense
against the various forms of political and direct
aggression mounted against the hemisphere ....
Mr. Rusk called in particular for the establishment of a
special security committee to recommend measures for pro-
tection against any acts of aggression resulting from
intervention of the Sino-Soviet Powers or others associated
with them. 38
President Dorticos of Cuba, in a lengthy reply to
Mr. Rusk, declared that the conference had no legal basis
80EA/Ser.F/11.3, Doc. 35, pp. 10-11.
I.
and that "international law had been treated w ontempt
for a precise end to condemn and isolate Cuba anc ur-
age the counter-revolutionaries in their hope of
ing the Cuban revolution. Polemical as the bulk
reply was, it frequently struck chords of sympathy and
understanding among the Latin American delegates and 1
undeniable appeal to those wary of the United States,
all know that this meeting is not directed against Cuba or
the people of Cuba. It is aimed to prevent the movement
of liberation and anti-imperialist groups. Cuba, he-
added with positive effect, had earlier denouncer
tions for a rebel invasion in 1961 and "history proved us
right." He defended summary executions in Cuba and clairaec
that human rights were "more real in Cuba than in the
of the continent." He referred to the Unitea States
"where millions of Negroes live in subhuman situation
In conclusion, he plucked the strings of internal self-
determination and non-intervention by saying that "Cuba
will respect the right of others to develop themselves
capitalist methods. But we have taken the road of social-
ism, and there is no force in existence capable of making
39
us turn back."
Private discussions continued throughout the week,
39Ibid. , Doc. 47.
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interrupted only by formal speeches before the General
Committee, As the meeting neared its close, the Uruguay
delegates, who had been without a clear mandate from a
divided collegiate executive at home and were repres
by two opposing members of that body, reached a decision
to support the suspension of Cuba from the OAS. Haiti,
after its initial hesitation, decided that it, too, would
go along. These were two votes which filled out the re-
quired two-thirds majority. Unanimity seemed hopeless,
even on a very much watered-down resolution, Brazil and
Mexico, in any case, remained adamant about denying sup-
port to any kind of sanctions. The general debate was not
resolved.
With the aim of pursuing a compromise procedure for
action against Cuba which would receive the maximum number
of votes, the resumption of the general session was delayed
until the evening of January 30, A proposal, modified
with Mr, Rusk's collaboration, stating that the incompati-
bility of the present Cuban regime with the inter-American
system must result automatically in her "exclusion"
—
thereby avoiding her direct expulsion by the conference
itself—still proved inadequate to gain the support of
six American states, Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile,
40Ecuador, and Mexico were unmoved.
40Keesing's, o£. cit
. , pp. 18, 714-718.

87
The legal arguments offered by these countr.
opposing exclusion of the Cuban government from the inter-
American system are found in the minutes of the meetii
of the Council of the OAS where the proposed Meetinc
41Consultation was first debated. They are encountered
again in the speeches delivered before the General Comrr.it-
42tee at Punta del Este, Finally, legal reservations were
recorded by declarations of Mexico and Ecuador for inclu-
sion in the final act and in the Acta de la Novena Sesion
# 43de la Comlsion General , Briefly summarized, they were
44these:
1. Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is not applicable
to the case (discussed in Chapter III, supx
2. Assuming the applicability of Article 6 of the
Treaty, the sanctions listed in Article 8 do
not include exclusion from the OAS of one of
its members.
3. If exclusion is not specifically provided for,
then the organization has no right to exclude
a member without first amending ti arter.
41OEA/Ser.G/II/C-
42OEA/Ser.F/II.8; Argentina, Doc, 42 ( espanol )
;
Mexico, Doc. 25 ( espanol ) ; Bolivia, Doc. 31 ( espanoT )
:
Chile, Doc. 16 (English) ; Brazil, Doc. 32 (English)
•
43 Ibid., Doc. 70 (English); Doc. 72 ( espanol ).
44Ronning, o£. cit . t pp. 21-22.
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4. Article 34 of the Charter of the Organization
of American States establishes the right of
all member states to participate in the inter«
American Conference which is the primary
of the inter-American system, a argument
that only the government and not the state of
Cuba is excluded is untenable because a state
participates only by means of its governmer
The arguments of those governments favoring exclu-
sion of the Cuban government can be found in the documents
45
of the sources cited above. They may be summarized as
^
-i -. 46follows:
1, Article 6 of the Rio Treaty is applicable to
the Cuban i« (discussed in Chapter III,
supra )
•
2. The law of the Treaty must be able to establish
not only the incompatibility of the present
Cuban government with the inter-American
system but the means of resolving that incom-
patibility as well.
450EA/Ser.F/II,8, o£. cit . t Colombia, Doc. 19
(English); Dominican Republic, Doc, 52 (English); El
Salvador, Doc, 42 ( espanol ) ; Co ica, .iol )
;
Venezuela, Doc, 36 \Engli eru, Doc, 38 1 ;
;






3, The restrictive enumeration in Article 8 of the
Rio Treaty refers more to Article 20 than to
Article 6, precisely because of the unforeseen
cases that Article 6 takes into account
(Article 20 provides that the measures pi
scribed in Article 8 shall be binding, with
the exception that no state shall be required
to use armed force without its consent. us,
presumably, Article 8 lists only those raeasi
that are binding on all once a decision has
been taken, and not possible measures that
can be taken,
)
4, It is necessary for a member to maintain a
democratic republican form of government.
Various resolutions can be cited that make it
the obligation of each American state to
practice "representative democracy," (This
was a Costa Rican argument, which, needless
to say, not all of the governments supporting
sanctions would care to press,)
5, Cuba is not excluded from the OAS, Only the
present government of Cuba is not permitted
to participate.
Of the nine resolutions approved and included in




two. Resolution VI, Exclusion of the Present Government
of Cuba from Participation in the Inter-American System,
stated in its final form that the present Government of
Cuba, which had officially identified itself as a Marxist-
Leninist government, was incompatible with the princ
and objectives of the inter-American system; that by this
incompatibility, it had excluded itself from participation
in the inter-American system. The resolution obtained the
48bare two-thirds majority required.
Resolution VIII, Economic Relations, called for the
immediate suspension of trade in arms with Cuba. It re-
ceived seventeen votes as did the resolution excluding
Cuba from the Inter-American Defense Board. The confer-
ence also resolved "to reiterate its adherence to the
principles of self-determination and non-intervention as
guiding standards of coexistence among the American
nations, 1 ' (Resolution III); reaffirmed the urgent necessity
for all American nations to "intensify immediately their
self-help and cooperative efforts under the Alliance for
Progress" (Resolution V); reaffirmed the need for holding
free elections (Resolution IV); and provided for the
47Pan American Union, Eighth Meet - tat
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
, inal Act , OL^A/Ser.C/II.S,
T3>62, Washington, D. ,
48Keesing's, 0£. cit . , pp. 18 and 715.
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broadening and strengthening of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Hume hts (Resolution IX). Of *\
significance was the establishment of a Special Consulta-
tive Committee on Hemispheric Security Against th
versive Action of International Communism. It was to act
as an advisory body to the member governments which
quire and request its assistance to fight communist sub-
version (Resolution II).
All resolutions were incorporated in the Final Act
of the Conference, whi s adopted unanimously in ory
Session on January 31, the Cuban delegation 3 absen
Thus, the Eighth Meeting of Consultation showe
perhaps puzzling ambivalence between solidarity and dis-
cord. Puzzling because the declarations le upon
which American solidarity had long rested were re asizec
but failed to show a common, practical interpretation of
what they meant. The evidence of discord was the mark of
the depth of that dichotomy in interpretati
^OEA/Ser. .3. tal Ac

CHAPTER V
THE CASE OF SOLIDARITY EVALUATED
There seems little doubt that those who called the
meeting did so for the purpose of halting the advance of
Sino-Soviet or communist influence and power into the
Western Hemisphere. This advance was to be resisted like
the "alien" incursions of the past which threatened the
people of the New World in the form of the Holy Alliance
and twentieth century Fascism.
In the days of the American colonies, there began
to grow an ethos among peoples sharing the struggle for
freedom from European rule and for personal liberty in a
land of their own, which with each recurring threat to
their new existence, drew them closer together in spirit
and in mind against the old traditional source of chaos
and tyranny in Europe. This strong negativism toward
Europe seemed, in large measure, responsible for the posi-
tive solidarity of the "Western Hemisphere Idea." But
even the author of this phrase has appended to it a sober-
ing thesis which speaks of past glory, by a referral to
"Its Rise and Decline." 1
Arthur P. Whitaker, The Western Hemisphere Idea
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1954).
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The decline of this aspect of solidarity, based as
it is on a separateness from Europe, was inevitable in an
increasingly interdependent international system and par-
ticularly in the NATO regional system which linked rather
than isolated Europe from the hemisphere.
From the fact of this new inter-dependence of
national states stems other political factors inimicable
to the traditional solidarity of the Americas, This con-
cerns the great disparity between the highly industrialized
nations and the underdeveloped emerging ones (in which
category the Latin American republics basically inhere)
and a new pattern of aspirations and requirements which
pit the have-not nations against former allies and bene-
factors who are increasingly called upon to fulfill the
rising expectations of the former. The continuing un-
satisfied demands of the Latin Americans for economic aid
from the United States have prompted them to turn outward
to Europe and Asia for both commercial substance and for
the purpose of applying political leverage against the
United States, Taken together with the communist threat,
the United States has belatedly undertaken the Alliance
for Progress whose purpose is only incidentally to satisfy
social and economic expectations of the Latin but to attack
the long-run sources of communist appeal which thrive on
poverty, hunger, and ignorance.
!i
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Herein is illustrated a basic difference of views.
The Latins have long sought improvement in commerce, in-
dustry, and social and economic conditions by United
States help. The United States, on the other hand, has
been concerned primarily with the security of the hemis-
phere from extra-continental forces. Their security being
provided by a strong northern neighbor, the Latins have
developed a dissimilar emphasis which is focused on main-
taining their autonomy from United States power while, at
the same time, coveting United States affluence and imi-
tating its institutions. Latin America expects that the
United States should aid them in the realization and per-
fection of both by economic means. In a revolutionary era
in which these expectations remain unfulfilled after cen-
turies of misery, traditional ties and concepts are shaken
to their foundations.
In preceding chapters, there have been traced only
partially some of the political frictions manifest in
mustering support against a communist threat to solidarity.
Why, indeed, should Latins plunge wholeheartedly into a
defense of the status quo which is not meeting their ex-
pectations . To many North Americans, this seems a question
hard to understand, much less to answer. The sense of
urgency which the United States has had toward the Com-
munist threat has not been shared by its Latin neighbors.
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It has appeared to them a struggle between major colossi
which has only limited effect on their lives. They con-
ceive that perhaps the promises of Marxism-Leninism could
in many ways fulfill the expectation which aspiration to
the principles of solidarity has failed to bring,
Latin-American aspirations for economic and social
betterment has a long history. Throughout the association
of these countries with a northern neighbor which had ad-
vanced rapidly and inexorably into the industrial age,
they have emphasized the importance of this aspect in re-
lations with the United States and have sought aid by
2Pan-Latin American bloc action to realize this end. This
single-mindedness has prevailed regardless of the subject
the United States brought as most important to the inter-
American conference table. At Caracas where a strong
anti-communist resolution was paramount in the United
States view, it still remained far surpassed by the longer
standing economic questions. It remains to the present
time, of transcendent importance. United States ignorance
of its priority in the Latin estimation has been a strong
source of cleavage adversely affecting solidarity.
2Northwestern University, United States-Latin
American Relations , The Organization of Ameri . :. ~" :ates ,
a study prepared by Professors George Blanckisten,"" Id
Guetzkow and John Plan, for the Senate Committee on Foreign




In the course of gathering support for its anti-
communist policy, the United States has tried to exchange
economic aid for Latin cooperation. In this context, the
Alliance for Progress has to prove much, and coming as
comparatively little, too late, may fail to meet American
expectations.
In the matter of anti-communist declarations, the
United States found unanimous support so long as the issue
was more nominal than real in this hemisphere. At the
Fourth Meeting of Ministers in Washington in 1951, anti-
communist solidarity seemed at its peak. So long as the
threat remained extra-continental, the hemisphere, almost
to a man, was willing to present a solid front of condemn-
natory declarations. When the issue became an intra-
hemisphere problem, however, and action not words were
required, the latent fear and perhaps hatred of a powerful
United States paralyzed collective action. Solidarity
retreated to the wings and the principles of non-
intervention and national sovereignty claimed the center
of the stage.
The case of Guatemala had an important impact in
that Latin America had dramatized for the first time that
declarations against the communist threat to solidarity
would require some sort of active intervention in the
affairs of a neighboring state if they were to be more
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than mere words. At this crucial juncture, the American
states refused collective reinterpretation of the non-
intervention principle and cast the die for divided opinion
on Cuba,
International tensions in the Western Hemisphere
built up to an unprecedented scale after January 1959.
The primary cause of these tensions seems to have been the
Castro regime of Cuba, The Organisation of American
States, as the only lawful and politically acceptable in-
strument for the revitalization of deteriorating soli-
darity, was faced with a dilemma. How can anti-communist
declarations be turned to effective action without violat-
ing the narrow definition seemingly inseparably attached
to national sovereignty among a group of nations para-
doxically committed to a system of collective security?
By Declaration of San Jose', the inter-American system
steadfastly refused to meet the problem head on. It
deflected its anti-communist ire extra-continentally, and
Mexico was joined by Venezeula, Colombia, Peru, and, at
least tacitly, by Brazil in exceedingly patient and
charitable utterances toward Cuba.
When the first truly revolutionary movement in the
post-war hemisphere swept Cuba, it enjoyed much popular
favor throughout the hemisphere. When it was captured by
international Communism which brought the island of Cuba
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into a dependency-alliance relationship with the Soviet
Union unique in Pan-American history, much of the hemis-
phere continued to take vicarious delight in the fact that
a small Caribbean island so long under United States
hegemony had been deftly plucked from the nest. Coming
as this did at the expense of the tyrannous Batista
dictatorship formerly abetted by the United States, the
forces of populism and nationalism responded in a way
which was inimicable to the United States policy of sanc-
tions against "uba; it made compromise imperative.
Therefore, the formula of "incompatibility" which
emerged from the Punta del Este Conference represented a
compromise between sanctions and non-intervention; between
the United States view that the very existence of a Commu-
nist government in the hemisphere constitutes aggression
and the predominant Latin American view that the internal
and external affairs of a state are not the subject of
intervention. The groundwork for the acceptance of this
concept had been laid in the history of the inter-American
system, with its repeated avowals that free representative
governments are the basis of American solidarity, and in
the system's in r>ing concern over the penetration of
international Communism. But acceptance by the conference
of the incompatibility formula was preliminary to Cuba's
expulsion from the Organization of American States, and
-
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here the six parted company with the United States, They
opposed expulsion as juridically unsound and politically
unacceptable
•
President John F. Kennedy declared himself well
pleased with the results of the Conference at Punta del
Este, and he warmly congratulated Secretary of State Dean
Rusk. Mr, Rusk's report to the nation pointed out that
for the first time all the American states—except Cuba,
of course—had denounced the concept of Marxism-Leninism
as being incompatible with the inter-American system;
had been condemned by name in far stronger terms than at
3previous conferences. These were two important advances
as the inter-American system goes, but far short of the
action required to meet an increasingly urgent situati
Cuba boasted of a victory of sorts at the confer-
ence, and it must be admitted that, in the short-term at
least, her "victory" was the more apparent and may be the
more telling. President Dorticos claimed that the confer-
ence had been "a defeat for the imperialist Government of
the United States" and that the United States of America
"having arrived at Punta del Este demanding severe sanc-
tions against Fidel Castro's regime, has had to draw back
3Dean Rusk, Report to the Nation : Che ta del
Este Conference
, Department of "state Pamphlet ' Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1962), 2 February 1962.
i
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and accept minimum results obtained at the cost of inter-
4
nal division with the pan-American system."
Dorticds * conception of the United States defeat
seemed supported by many United States and foreign news-
papers which reflected the disappointment of the confer-
ence's results. The New York Times coiamented that
.__.
• it was generally accepted that the President
/KennedvT was putting the best face on this disap-
pointment ^and that/ many diplomats privately, and
some members of Congress publicly, were voicing
doubts about the conference * s substantive achieve-
ments .5
For the Latin Americans, the most significant fea-
ture of the conference was the emergence of a grouo, in-
cluding the largest and most democratic states in Latin
America, which held to an independent line in the face
great pressure. On the other hand, the United States was
supported by the smaller and weaker states which number in
their ranks the least democratic elements in the hemis-
phere. These facts bode ill for the success of United
States policies involving the hemispheric system. The
Good Neighbor policy was formulated to secure United
States objectives through goodwill engendered by the




6G. Connell-Smith, "The Future of the OAS," The
World Today
, Vol. 18, No. 3, March 1962, p. 119.
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exercise of restraint in her relations with her weaker
neighbors* The Alliance for Progress is a new manifesta-
tion of an old goodwill seeking its realization through
economic and social cooperation* In this connection, the
United States is called upon to do far more for her neigh-
bors in return for substantially less than full attainment
of her major policy objectives*
Preoccupied with Communism in the rest of the
world, the potential threat inherent in post—war economic
and social revolution had tended to be ignored in Latin
America* Only after becoming convinced of the threat to
Western Hemisphere nations, did the United States act to
favor this revolution to which so much attention had been
directed in Europe* In the meantime, the Cold War tended
to be viewed by Latin America as essentially a struggle
7between the United States and the Soviet Union* That is
to say, that international Communism was directed more at
United States hegemony than at hemispheric security*
These factors strengthened the idea of a mutual reciprocity
economic aid from the United States in return for political
support of her policies* The connection between the
United States, Cuba and the "Alianza para el Progreso" is
7Mildred Adams, Latin America : Evolution or
Explosion (New York: Dodd & Mead, 1963); Roberto
-
"^




an example of this idea. There is irony in this arrange-
ment, in that the ruling elite in Latin America, with whoa
the "self-help* aspects of the Alliance are entrusted for
execution, is the very group which has the most to lose
immediately by the success of the economic and social
8
reforms intended. Whether the ruling classes of the
Americas can he persuaded that it is in their own long-
term interest to accept a reduction in their personal
-lege for the success of the Alliance for Progress and
the betterment of their respective nations remains to be
9
seen*
f greater significance is the fact that it is the
ruling class in Latin America from whom has b«ten drawn
the greatest sympathy and support for the United states
policies against communism in the hemisphere; it is this
group which has expressed the strongest desire to see
Castro overthrown* All this points up a basic weakness in
the United States position: the elements in Latin America
lending the strongest support in the relatively short-term
strategy against Castro are least likely to support
aims of the Alliance for Progress which is the long-term
policy for combating communism in the hemisphere.
Adams, op . clt . , 2.




Faced with the dire consequences of further Commu-
nist success in the hemisphere, the stated fundamental
values of the inter-American system must become active
programs of defense against the subversion of democracy.
At present the great obstacle to concerted action is the
supremacy of the dogma of absolute sovereignty, on non-
intervention, which may prove to have been maintained at
incalculable cost to the well being of the hemisphere.
Internal self-determination is a respected ideal; but when
the state elects as its symbol the communist myth, it auto-
matically relinquishes its self-determining aspects and
comes under the determinants of international Communism,
It is possible to view the incompatibility formula
as a step further toward some firm legal obligations
backed by adequate sanctions to assure the growth of that
democracy which Dr. Larreta has asserted is so essential
to peace in the hemisphere. The acceptance of this
formula was a success for United States diplomacy at the
conference—and a significant one—considering the internal
A. J. Thomas and Ann V. Thomas, "Democracy and
the OAS," Minnesota Law Review , Vol. XLVI, 1961-1962
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1962), p. 381.
Pan American Union, Consultation of the Govern-
ment of Uruguay and Replies of the " overrunents* on
arallelism Between Democracy and Peace , "international
Rights of Man and Collective Action in"~Defense of those





political tensions in Latin America militating against any
support of United States proposals affecting a sister
12
republic. The United States Senate was lavish in its
praise of the diplomatic prowess of Secretary of State
13Dean Rusk. But it cannot be said that marginally sup-
ported declarations will alone be successful in maintain-
ing solidarity against Communism, Moral condemnation of
Cuba could not be less effective against a government cut
loose from its hemispheric ties. If democracy is to be
defended and the intervention of Communism is to be ex-
pelled, the inter-American system must be expedited toward
the consensus so vital to definitive action.
Can such a consensus be achieved before freedom in
the hemisphere is mortally undermined? If it cannot,
given the decades it has taken to build the most enduring
and effective regional system in modern history, at what
point should expediency supersede consent. The United
States is the primary source of economic, political, and
military power in the hemisphere. The United States
desires to preserve and strengthen the inter-American com-
munity by seeking multi-lateral support of her policies
12
' Adams, loc , clt , ; Campos, o£, cit • , p. 39,
13United States Congress, Senate, Record of the 87ti
Congress , Second Session, February 2, 1962 (Washington
:""
Government Printing Office, 1962), p, 1,395,
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by its membership, is a vital and necessary policy. But
it is tending to give second priority to the consideration
of hemispheric security. In spite of the many fine reso-
lutions and reaffirmations of democratic principle, the
inter-American system cannot survive meaningfully if such
avowals are not backed with actions that implement them.
Idealistic principle must not be out of touch with prag-
matic political fact. Unless the legalistic framework
within which the OAS functions is backed by a dynamic and
practical political consensus about the purposes of its
existence, it may be progressively eroded to the point of
absurdity. Consent and not coercion is the sounder basis
for lasting progress, but the United States must bear the
responsibility for the success—or failure—of either
course. If hemispheric consensus is tardy in marshalling
to meet the threat, stern and vigorous measures may be
necessary to meet it with less than unanimous approval by
all the members of the OAS. The late President John F.
Kennedy once said:
Should it ever appear that the Inter-American
doctrine of non-intervention merely conceals or
excuses a policy of nonaction—if the nations of
this hemisphere should fail to meet their commit-
ments against outside Communist penetration—then
... this Government will not hesitate in meeting
its primary obligations, which are the security
of our Nation. 14
14United States Department of State, letin
,
8 May 1961, quoting John F. Kennedy (Washington: Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1961), p. 659.
i
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Such national necessity could sound the death knell of the
Organization and, in the long run, prove as detrimental to
national as well as hemisphere security as the event which
brought it to pass.
On the horns of this dilemma rests the future of
the Organization of American States and the solidarity and
security of the Western Hemisphere,
I. CONCLUSION
The concept of solidarity has been without a symbol.
It defines a system of socially accepted beliefs about a
political way of life which has failed to find symbolic
representation in the institutional form of the Organiza-
tion of American States or in a realization of a major
portion of its principles. The element of what Plato
called mythos , without implication of falsity, underlies
the concept of the solidarity of the Americas. It was
born of circumstances and served to provide a rallying
point for hemisphere aspirations to life, liberty, and
property for the individual which only the United States
has thus far achieved with any degree of perfection. To
the underdeveloped nations of Latin America, the principles
of hemispheric solidarity remain largely anticipatory, and
like many of their national constitutions , only fond
avowals which are out of touch with the real probability
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that they can take on practical political existence in 1
form envisaged.
The real paradox confronting the case is that the
very principles themselves upon which the notion of soli-
darity is founded are those which tend to fragment
American solidarity. The principles of non-intervention,
sovereignty, and close economic cooperation for social,
cultural and ultimately political unity are mutually in-
compatible in the transitional environment of changing
international political relationships. There seems con-
siderable evidence that, to Latin Americans, solidarity
has become only another name for imperialist domination.
It is reasonable to observe with pride and some
reverence that there has existed in the past, and remains
in the present, an international mythos among free,
sovereign states charged with a wide range of the emotions
elicited by Western liberal political belief. Through
this belief, loyalty is inspired to the abstract symbol of
freedom in unity under peace and law in the Western Hemis-
phere.
This mystique is sorely tried by the times and at
present is shaken profoundly by a violently transitional
environment. W. W. Rostow asserts that one must begin by
assuming that a transitional society is in a profound dis-
equilibrium and pose the question: What patterns and

rates of change are most consistent with the maintenance
of social continuity? Or, in operational terms, by what
process can the transitional be fulfilled in ways which
avoid violent civil conflict and minimize a society's
15
vulnerability to external and internal aggression:
Realizing that the principles of inter-American solidarity
can thrive only in an atmosphere of reasonable stability
and order, it would serve United States policymakers well
to remember also a fact which Guglielmo Ferrero has noted
in writing of the reconstruction of Europe. Directing his
attention to the period of great national and international
change after 1815, marked by the revolutionary spir
France, he makes an observation apropos of the contemporary
scene:
One of the greatest mistakes committed by human
indolence is the belief that order is best pre-
served by keeping it as it stands. The only
real guardians are those who reconstruct it .16
15W. W. Rostow, "The Policymakers View of Transi-
tional Societies," United States Department of State
Bulletin , 24 September 1962.
16Guglielmo °errero, The Reconstruction of Europe
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